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Pursuant to Utah Rule ofAppellate Procedure 24(a), Plaintiff-Appellant Intermountain
Sports, Inc., (hereinafter "Appellant"), by and through its counsel of record John Martinez
and B. Ray Zoll, hereby submits the following Opening Brief:
LIST OF PARTIES
The parties to this appeal are identified in the caption herein. Appellant's claims against
Murray City were dismissed by stipulation and are not the subject of this appeal. (R. 281)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
LIST OF PARTIES

. . . . ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
...;
Nature of the case, course of proceedings, disposition in court below
Statement of Facts

5
5
5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

7

ARGUMENT
9
I. INVERSE CONDEMNATION CLAIM:
UDOT INVERSELY CONDEMNED APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO USE
ITS LAND FOR THE OPERATION OF A COMMERCIAL BUSINESS 9
Introduction
9
A.
The relevant property is Appellant's "right to use its land for the
operation of a commercial business," not physical "access to property"
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L "Property" in the legal sense means legal rights

11
1

2. The right to use land is a distinct protected right
B.

C.

12

Appellant properly alleged two types of "takings": "substantial
interference" with the operation of its commercial enterprise which
"destroyed or materially lessened its value" in excess of $2 Million, and
"substantial interference" with the operation of its commercial
enterprise whereby Appellants right to "use and enjoyment" of its
commercial enterprise was substantially "abridged or destroyed" in
excess of $2 Million
16

j

UDOTs reconstruction of 1-15 caused a taking for a "public use" of
Appellant's right to use its land for operation of a commercial enterprise
19
i

D.

Appellant's loss of business resulting from UDOTs closure of the 45th
South offramp for about 4 years during the 1-15 reconstruction was
legally cognizable "harm" which, if a jury so determines, is
compensable
20

E.

UDOTs closure of the 45th South offramp for about 4 years during the
1-15 reconstruction "caused" Appellant's harm which, if a jury so
determines, renders UDOT liable for the resulting harm
22
<

F.

The jury also may offset any special benefits Appellant derived from
the project
23

II. UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS CLAIM:
UDOT UNLAWFULLY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST APPELLANT 25
A.

The statutes from which UDOT draws its power to construct freeways
and authorize UDOT to dictate the manner in which such construction
will be performed are "laws" which were applied non-uniformly by
UDOT, violating Appellant's right to Uniform Operation of Laws 25

B.

Appellant's allegation that UDOT unlawfully discriminated against
Appellant by arbitrarily and capriciously providing other businesses
similarly situated to Appellant with accommodations not provided to
Appellant sufficiently alleges membership in an identifiable class for
purposes of Appellant's Uniform Operation of Laws claim
27
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JURISDICTION
This case was transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)(2002); the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over
this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j)(2002), as an appeal from final judgment.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Inverse Condemnation Claim
1. "Relevant Property" Issue: Did the trial court erroneously conclude that the relevant
property for purposes of Appellants inverse condemnation claim is "access to property,"
rather than Appellant's "right as to use its land for the operation of a commercial business?"
(R. 147-48; 11/10/03 HearingTr. p.23,11. 9-12, 17-20)
Standard of Review: A grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings for failure
to state a claim is reviewed as a question of law for correctness. No deference is given to the
trial court. Factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom are
accepted as true and are considered in a light most favorable to the Appellant. Affirmance
is proper only if Appellant cannot prove any set of facts in support of its claims. Houghton
v. Dept. of Health. 2002 UT 101, f2, 57 P.3d 1067; Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795
P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990).
2. "Taking" Issue: Did the trial court erroneously conclude that Appellant did not state
a "takings" claim, even though Appellant alleged two "takings" claims: (1) a "substantial
interference" with the operation of its commercial enterprise which "destroyed or materially
lessened its value" in excess of $2 Million; and (2) a "substantial interference" with the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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operation of its commercial enterprise, whereby Appellant's right to the "use and enjoyment"
of i ts c ommercial enterprise w as s ubstantially " abridged o r d estroyed" i n e xcess o f $ 2
Million? (R. 148-50; 11/10/03 HearingTr. p.23,11. 12-14)
Standard of Review: Question of law reviewed for correctness. No deference to trial
court. Factual allegations and all reasonable inferences accepted as true and considered in
light most favorable to Appellant. Affirmance proper only if Appellant cannot prove any set
of facts in support of its claims. Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2002 UT 101, f2, 57 P.3d
1067: Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990).
3. "Public Use" Issue: Although the trial court did not reach the issue, should this
court hold for purposes of remand that UDOTs reconstruction of 1-15, causing the taking of
Appellants right to use its land for operation of a commercial enterprise, was for a "public
use?" (R. 150; 11/10/03 HearingTr. p. 23,11. 21-25, p.24,1.1)
Standard of Review: Question of law reviewed for correctness. No deference to trial
court. Factual allegations and all reasonable inferences accepted as true and considered in
light most favorable to Appellant. Affirmance proper only if Appellant cannot prove any set
of facts in support of its claims. Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2002 UT 101, f2, 57 P.3d
1067; Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990).
4. "Harm" Issue: Did the trial court erroneously conclude that Appellant's loss of
business resulting from UDOT's closure of the 45th South offramp for about 4 years during
the 1-15 reconstruction—which the court characterized as a "temporary denial of access to
property" which was not "permanent, continuous, or inevitably recurring"—was not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

compensable harm as a matter of law? (R. 150-51; 11/10/03 HearingTr. p.20,11.20-23, p.24,
<

Standard of Review: Question of law reviewed for correctness. No deference to trial
court. Factual allegations and all reasonable inferences accepted as true and considered in
light most favorable to Appellant. Affirmance proper only if Appellant cannot prove any set
of facts in support of its claims. Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2002 UT 101, .f2, 57 P.3d

4

1067; Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990).
5. "Causation" Issue: Did the trial court erroneously conclude that UDOTs closure of
1
the 45th South offramp for about 4 years during the 1-15 reconstruction did not "cause"
Appellant's harm as a matter of law? (R. 151; 11/10/03 HearingTr. p.24,11. 4-12)
Standard of Review: Question of law reviewed for correctness. No deference to trial
court. Factual allegations and all reasonable inferences accepted as true and considered in
light most favorable to Appellant. Affirmance proper only if Appellant cannot prove any set

*

of facts in support of its claims. Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2002 UT 101, f2, 57 P.3d
1067; Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990).

i
B. Uniform Operation of Laws Claim
1. Identity of "Law" Issue: Did the trial court erroneously conclude that the statutes
from which UDOT draws its power to construct freeways and authorize UDOT to dictate the
manner in which such construction will be performed are not "laws" applied non-uniformly
byUDOT? (R. 152; 11/10/03 HearingTr. p.25,11.3-7)
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4

Standard of Review: Question of law reviewed for correctness. No deference to trial
court. Factual allegations and all reasonable inferences accepted as true and considered in
light most favorable to Appellant. Affirmance proper only if Appellant cannot prove any set
of facts in support of its claims. Houghton v. Dept. of Health. 2002 UT 101, ]29 57 P.3d
1067: Colman v. Utah State Land Board 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990).
2. Identity of "class" Issue: Did the trial court erroneously conclude that Appellant's
allegation that UDOT unlawfully discriminated against Appellant by arbitrarily and
capriciously providing other businesses similarly situated to Appellant with accommodations
not provided to Appellant did not allege membership in an identifiable class? (R. 152;
11/10/03 HearingTr. p.24,11.24-25; p.25,11.1-2)
Standard of Review: Question of law reviewed for correctness. No deference to trial
court. Factual allegations and all reasonable inferences accepted as true and considered in
light most favorable to Appellant. Affirmance proper only if Appellant cannot prove any set
of facts in support of its claims. Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2002 UT 101,1f2, 57 P.3d
1067; Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL
UTAH CONST, ART. I, §22.

Private Property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation.
UTAH CONST, ART. I, §24.

All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§§ 72-6-101-119, inclusive. (Addendum Exhibit 1)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
<

Nature of the case, course of proceedings, disposition in court below

^

For over 15 years Appellant worked hard to develop his Recreational Vehicle (RV)
sales business in order to provide for his family and enjoy the fruits of his labors. Then over
a period of 4 years, from 1997 through 2001, UDOT rebuilt the 1-15 freeway and effectively
ran Appellant out of business. UDOTfs position is that the project "require[d] the breaking

j

of eggs," and that Appellant's loss of his livelihood is just too bad. (11/10/03 HearingTr. p.8,
11.19-20)
This case is about whether a jury should be given the opportunity to decide whether
fairness and justice demand that the approximately $2 Million in losses suffered by Appellant
as a result of the 1-15 reconstruction should be borne by the people of the State as a whole,

'

rather than being left as a burden on Appellant alone. The trial court granted UDOT's motion
for judgment on the pleadings and entered final judgment dismissing Appellant's claims as

g

a matter of law. (R. 286, Addendum Exhibit 2, p.2)
Statement of Facts
a. For over 15 years Appellant owned and operated an RV sales company on a parcel
of land located at 4225 South 500 West in Murray, Utah, near the 4500 South offramp from
the 1-15 freeway. (R. 2-3, Addendum Exhibit 3,1J8; 11/10/03 HearingTr. p.27,11. 4-20)

*

b. For about 4 years, from July 1997 to May 2001, UDOT conducted a massive
reconstruction of the 1-15 freeway in order to benefit the people of Utah. (R. 5, Addendum
Exhibit 3,1fl[l9-22)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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J

c. In July 1997, UDOT closed the 4500 South offramp adjacent to Appellant's RV
business as part of the 1-15 reconstruction project. (R. 5, Addendum Exhibit 3, f 19)
d. From July 1997 through December 1998—a period of VA years-access to
Appellant's RV business was closed. (R. 5, Addendum Exhibit 3, ff 19-20)
e. From January 1999 through May 2001-an additional period of about 2lA yearsUDOT placed periodic closures on traffic at the 4500 South Street offramp. (R. 5, Addendum
Exhibit 3,121)
f. Thus, from July 1997 until May 2001-a total period of nearly 4 years-UDOT
effectively closed the 4500 South offramp, as well as the streets for East and West traffic
adjacent to the 4500 South offramp. (R. 5, Addendum Exhibit 3, ^[22)
g. Instead of direct access off the 4500 South offramp, Appellant was left with a
circuitous, 2.5-mile loop that snaked behind and around the area, thereby confusing,
frustrating, and ultimately eliminating Appellant's potential customers. (R. 5-6, Addendum
Exhibit 3, ^23)
h. The net impact on Appellant from UDOT's I-15 reconstruction was that trafficflow
on I-15 in the area of 4500 South Street dropped two-thirds from the traffic flow prior to such
reconstruction, and the bulk of the remaining 1/3 of Appellant's potential customers ended
up getting lost and never arriving at Appellant's RV business. (R. 6, Addendum Exhibit 3,

1f24)
i. As a direct result of UDOTs reconstruction of 1-15, Appellant suffered losses in
excess of $2 Million. (R. 6, 9, Addendum Exhibit 3, ff25, 36, 37)
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j . UDOT provided other similarly situated businesses in the area with accommodations
i

for direct access to 4500 South offramp traffic, and did not provide such accommodations
to Appellant, thereby unlawfully discriminating against Appellant. (R. 6, 10, Addendum
Exhibit 3 , ^ 2 6 , 3 9 , 40)

*
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

For over 15 years Appellant worked hard to develop his Recreational Vehicle (RV)

^

business in order to provide for his family and enjoy the fruits of his labors. Then over a
period of 4 years, from 1997 through 2001, UDOT rebuilt the 1-15 freeway and effectively
i
ran Appellant out of business. UDOTs position is that the project tfrequire[d] the breaking
of eggs," and that Appellants loss of his livelihood is just too bad. (11/10/03 HearingTr. p.8,
11.19-20)

-j

*

This case is about whether a jury should be given the opportunity to decide whether
fairness andjustice demand that the approximately $2 Million in losses suffered by Appellant

,

as a result of the 1-15 reconstruction should be borne by the people of the State as a whole,
rather than being left as a burden on Appellant alone. Appellant is not seeking a windfall or
to raid the public treasury. As is well established in the analogous area of city and county
improvement districts, the jury may offset any special benefits conferred on Appellant from
the special harm suffered by Appellant as a result of the 1-15 reconstruction.

•

Appellant asserts two constitutional claims against UDOT: Inverse Condemnation and
Uniform Operation of Laws. On its Inverse Condemnation claim, Appellant makes 6
contentions: (1) The relevant property is Appellant's "right to use its land for the operation
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of a commercial business/1 not physical "access to property" as the trial court held. (2)
Appellant properly stated two types of "takings," by alleging a "substantial interference" with
the operation of its commercial enterprise which "destroyed or materially lessened its value"
in excess of $2 Million, and by alleging a "substantial interference" with the operation of its
commercial enterprise whereby Appellant's right to "use and enjoyment" of its commercial
enterprise was substantially "abridged or destroyed" in excess of $2 Million. (3) UDOT's
reconstruction of 1-15 caused a taking for a "public use" of Appellant's right to use its land
for operation of a commercial enterprise. (4) Appellant's loss of business resulting from
UDOT's closure of the 45th South offramp for about 4 years during the 1-15 reconstruction
was legally cognizable "harm" which, if a jury so determines, is compensable. (5) UDOT's
closure of the 45th South offramp for about 4 years during the 1-15 reconstruction "caused"
Appellant's harm which, if a jury so determines, renders UDOT liable for the resulting harm.
(6) A jury may offset any special benefits Appellant derived from the reconstruction project.
On its Uniform Operation of Laws claim, Appellant makes 2 contentions: (1) The
statutes from which UDOT draws its power to construct freeways and authorize UDOT to
dictate the manner in which such construction will be performed are "laws" which were
applied non-uniformly by UDOT, violating Appellant's right to Uniform Operation of Laws.
(2) Appellant's allegation that UDOT unlawfully discriminated against Appellant by
arbitrarily and capriciously providing other businesses similarly situated to Appellant with
accommodations not provided to Appellant sufficiently alleges membership in an identifiable
class for purposes of Appellant's Uniform Operation of Laws claim.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
I
I. INVERSE CONDEMNATION CLAIM:
UDOT INVERSELY CONDEMNED APPELLANTS RIGHT TO USE
ITS LAND FOR THE OPERATION OF A COMMERCIAL BUSINESS
Introduction
The Just Compensation Clause of the Utah Constitution provides: "Private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." UTAH CONST, art. I,
Sec. 22. Samuel R. Thurman, who introduced the Clause at the 1895 Constitutional
Convention, set out most eloquently its importance in protecting private property from

%

governmental harm:
"I believe that the right of property is a sacred right, and no matter if it is the widow's
mite, I believe that the man who owns just one little ewe lamb has just as much right
to that as the man has to his cattle that graze on a thousand hills...."
[G]entlemen, this is a serious question we are dealing with. There is nothing more
sacred than the right of property, unless it be the right to live and enjoy your liberty."
Proceedings

and Debates

of

the Constitutional

Convention,

|

336-37, 625-26

(1898VAddendum Exhibit 4): see also id., 333 ("I don't believe there is a question to come
4
up before this Convention that will be of greater importance to it than the one that is being
discussed right now.H)(William F. James).
The Just Compensation Clause protects against two general types of "condemnations:"
(1) "Direct condemnation," as when a private home that lies in the path of a proposed
freeway is purchased "directly" by UDOT. There is no question that (A) "private property"

|

(the home), (B) a "taking" (expropriation of the home), and (C) a "public use" (freeway), are
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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all present. In that setting, UDOT clearly is required to initiate a direct condemnation
proceeding and pay fair market value to the owner. UTAH CODE ANN. § § 78-34-1 -78-34-20.
(2) "Inverse condemnation," in contrast, occurs when private property is taken or
damaged for public use without initiation of direct condemnation proceedings by the
governmental entity doing the "taking or damaging." Thus, if UDOT were to build a freeway
mistakenly believing it already had title to land which was actually owned by a private party,
the owner could bring an inverse condemnation action to require UDOT to pay just
compensation. Such an owner would be required to allege and prove: (A) a property interest,
(B) had been taken or damaged (C) for public use. Farmers New World Life Insurance Co.
v. Bountiful City. 803 P.2d 1241, 1243-44 (Utah 1990); for discussion of takings analysis,
see 3 Sands, Libonati & Martinez, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, §§ 16.53.10-16.53.50;
Martinez & Libonati, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, A Transactional Approach 31239 (2000).
Inverse condemnation law in Utah has followed a tortuous path. The Utah Supreme
Court initially held a claim could be brought directly under the Just Compensation Clause
without implementing legislation. Webber v. Salt Lake City. 40 Utah 221,224,120 P. 503,
504 (1911). The court later reversed itself, holding no such claim could be brought.
Fairclough v. Salt Lake County. 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960). Then in 1990, the
Court reversed itself again, holding such a claim can be brought. Colman v. Utah State Land
Board, 795 P.2d 622, 630-34 (Utah 1990). Accordingly, constant resort to first principles is
indispensable to keeping one's bearings in the field.
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The foundational principle of inverse condemnation law is that "The tendency under
I
our system is too often to sacrifice the individual to the community." Stockdale v. Rio
Grande Western Rv. Co.. 28 Utah 201, 203, 77 P. 849, 852 (1904). Like the analogous
federal provision in the Fifth Amendment, the Utah Just Compensation Clause "was designed
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." U.S. CONST. AMEND. V;

|

Armstrong v. United States. 364 U.S. 40,49 (I960).
Appellant has the right under the Utah Constitution to have a jury decide whether

i
fairness and justice require that the costs Appellant suffered as a direct result of the 1-15
reconstruction should be borne by the public, and not shouldered by Appellant alone.
A.

The relevant property is Appellant's "right to use its land for the operation of
a commercial business," not physical "access to property"
The trial court characterized Appellant's property as "convenient access to the

freeway". (R. 291, Addendum Exhibit 2, p.7, f 17.) The trial court thereby misconceived the
relevant property as physical access, rather than the legal right to use land.
1. "Property" in the legal sense means legal rights

4

"The word "property" although in common parlance applied to a tract of land or a
chattel, to a physical thing, means in its legal signification only therightsof the owner
in relation to it. Property is the right of any person to possess, use, enjoy and dispose
of a thing. The term "property" is often used to indicate the res, or subject of the
property rather than the property itself. "
McGrew v. Industrial Commission. 96 Utah 203, 204, 85 P.2d 608, 610 (1938). See also
I
Colman 795 P.2d at 625 ("some protectible interest").
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The types of rights protected under Article I Section 22 are "practically unlimited.ff
Farmers New World Life Insurance Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d at 1244, quoting Lund
v. Salt Lake County. 58 Utah 546, 200 P. 510, 512 (1921). Inverse condemnation protects
"every species of property . . . including legal and equitable rights of every description."
Bagfordv.EphraimCitv. 904P.2d 1095,1098 (Utah 1995).
2. The right to use land is a distinct protected right
Appellant alleges it owns an RV sales company on a parcel of land located at 4225
South 500 West in Murray, Utah. (R. 2-3, Addendum Exhibit 3,ffi[3,8) The right to use land
is a distinct and separate component in the bundle of rights we call "ownership." U.S. v.
District Court, 121 Utah 18, 29,242 P.2d 774,779 (1952)(Wolfe,CJ., concurring in denial
of petition for rehearing); see also Provo City Corp. v. Knudsen, 558 P.2d 1332,1334 (Utah
1977)(right to use land affected by overflight easement on adjacent land must be "dealt with
separately" and is separately compensable); Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall
Consol. Mines Co.. 53 Utah 413, 174 P. 172 (1918)(right to use a tunnel).
The drafters of the Utah Constitution clearly understood the significance of protecting
the right to use land, and fully intended the Just Compensation Clause to cover it. See
Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention, 326-27 (1898)(protection
extends to circumstances "where an elevated road was erected upon a street and while it did
not touch the property of the abutting owner, did not destroy a brick, did not take a foot of
his ground, it did affect his use and occupation of his premises very disastrously.")(Charles
S. VariantAddendum Exhibit 4): see also id., 328 ("I believe ... that when the public use a
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man's property or make an improvement that virtually destroys the use of that property, that
they should pay for it as much as if the property itself were taken.")(Franklin S. Richards).
This court also has recognized the critical distinction between physical access and the
right to use land. In Carpet Barn v. State, 786 P.2d 770 (Utah Ct App 1990), UDOT had
tried unsuccessfully to buy a strip of land along the frontage of Carpet Barn's land in order
to widen Redwood Road. Carpet Barn refused to sell, so UDOT widened the road without
buying the strip of land. UDOT built a retaining wall which ranged from sixteen inches to
two feet high, topped by a four-foot chain link fence, across the front of Carpet Barn's land.
The finished project limited Carpet Barn's access to a twenty-foot wide driveway running
from Redwood Road to the rear of Carpet Barn's facility, even though the minimum
requirement for such driveways was twenty-five feet. The wall built by UDOT also prevented
parking in front of the building, eliminating fifteen to twenty diagonal parking spaces.
Finally, the footings built by UDOT encroached six inches onto Carpet Barn's land. This
court held that "the State's construction of the wall extending along the legal right-of-way
line deprived [Carpet Barn of its] long-standing right to utilize part of [its] property for
store-front parking, thus entitling [it] to compensation for any decrease in value caused by
the loss of parking spaces." Carpet Barn v. State. 786 P.2d at 774 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Three D Corporation v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321 (Utah Ct App
1988) the City tried unsuccessfully to buy a part of Three D's land in order to widen the
street. The City nevertheless extended the street surface to the existing legal boundary and
built a solid curb along the length of Three D's land, where before there had been continuous
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and accessible frontage along the street, thereby depriving Three D of most of its former
parking spaces. This court held Three D was entitled to compensation because the City had
"substantially impaired [Three D's] long-standing right to utilize [its] property for store-front
parking and [had caused Three D] direct, peculiar injury" and consequent devaluation of its
commercial property. Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d at 1326.
And as recently as April 29, 2004, this court once again held that the right to use is
a distinct, constitutionally-protected property right. In Diamond B-Y Ranches v. Tooele
County, 2004 UT App 135, the County refused Diamond a conditional use permit to operate
a gravel pit because of neighbors1 opposition. Diamond alleged that its economically viable
use had been "taken" under the federal and state Just Compensation Clauses. The County
argued Diamond had no protected property right in the issuance of a conditional use permit.
Rejecting that contention, this court held that Diamond had stated a takings claim if all—or
only some—of its beneficial uses had been deprived, and that "Diamond's constitutionally
protected property interest... is the beneficial use of its property in general."Id. at 1fl[14,18.
And in The View Condominium Owners Ass'n v. MSICO. L.L.C.. 2004 UT App 104,
497 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, this court also recently held that the right to use is a distinct property
right entitled to constitutional protection—even if interference with such use is of limited
duration. Sorenson Resources Company was developing 25 acres in the Town of Alta. The
View Condo Owners Association ("The View") bought lot 8, and Alta approved its
development, but on condition that lot 9, still owned by Sorenson, was designated as a snow
storage site for lot 8. Afterward, MSICO bought lot 9, then sued Alta, seeking to free lot 9
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from t he b urden o f T he V iewfs s now s tor age u s e r ight. A lta s ettled w ith M SICO, a nd
purported to remove the burden on lot 9. Alta also threatened to prohibit "occupancy of The
View or portions thereof during snow periods." Id., f 9. The View then sued Alta for an
unconstitutional "taking" of The View's snow storage use right appurtenant to lot 8. First, this
court held there was "no dispute as to The View's property interest in the continued use and
development of Lot 8," and that "the protectible property interest at the heart of the takings

%

claim is the interest that The View asserts in Lot 8 itself." Id, T{36 n.3. Moreover, this courtalso held that if proved at trial, the prohibition against occupancy of some or all of The View

i
condos would be constitutionally compensable. Id, ^[36,
UDOT similarly deprived Appellant of the right to use its land for operation of a
commercial enterprise. Appellant properly alleged a constitutionally protected property right
and is entitled to have a jury determine the compensable harm thereby caused.
The trial court misconstrued Appellant's claim as one for deprivation of physical

j

access. By focusing on physical access rather than on the legal right to use land, the trial
court made the same mistake as UDOT in Carpet Bam, and the City in Three D. The
i
gravamen of Appellant's complaint is not that its physical access has been impaired, but
rather that UDOT has substantially impaired Appellant's right to use its land for the operation
of a business, and has caused Appellant direct, peculiar injury and consequent devaluation
of its commercial property. Caipet Bam v. State. 786 P.2d at 773-74; Three D Corporation
v. Salt Lake City. 752 P.2d at 1326.
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B.

Appellant properly alleged two types of "takings": "substantial interference"
with the operation of its commercial enterprise which "destroyed or materially
lessened its value" in excess of $2 Million, and "substantial interference" with
the operation of its commercial enterprise whereby Appellant's right to "use and
enjoyment" of its commercial enterprise was substantially "abridged or
destroyed" in excess of $2 Million
The trial court held Appellant had not properly alleged a takings claim because

"temporary denial of access to property does not constitute a taking.ff (R. 290, Addendum
Exhibit 2, p.6, Tf 16) The trial court thereby compounded its erroneous characterization of the
relevant property as physical access, (addressed in Part LA, above), with a misconception
about what is a sufficient allegation of a taking under the Utah Just Compensation Clause.
Article I Section 22 prohibits "takings'1 of private property for public use without
payment of just compensation. UTAH CONST, ART. I, §22. A "taking" is "any substantial
interference with private property which destroys or materially lessens its value, or by which
the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed."
Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d at 626 (citations omitted). Appellant alleged:
"f 18. After reconstruction of 1-15 began, traffic flow on 1-15, in the area of 4500
South Street, dropped two thirds from the traffic flow figures prior to the
Reconstruction Project.
1fl9. In July 1997, UDOT began reconstruction on I-15 [a]ffecting4500 SouthStreet,
by closing the off-ramp to the Affected Property
f 20. Access to the Affected Property was closed until December 1998, a period of 18
months instead of the 12 months promised by UDOT in its construction contract.
TJ21. The City and UDOT placed periodic closures on traffic at the 4500 South Street
off-ramp over the following 2 1/2 years.
Tf22. The State and City were effectively closing access to freeway exits and
entrances, as well as access for East and West traffic at the 4500 South Street offramp, from July 1997 until May 2001, nearly a period of four years.
T[23. The access provided by Defendants, in lieu of direct access off the 4500 South
off-ramp, involved a circuitous 2.5-mile loop... behind the Affected Property, which
frustrated and eliminated potential customers. The Circuitous Loop was impractical
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and unreasonable for purposes of bringing prospective customers from the freeway
to Plaintiffs business. Not only was the critical line of sight lost, but also the route
was lengthy and confusing.
^24. Upon information and belief, the already significantly diminished number of
potential customers from drive-by traffic, now 1/3 of what it was prior to reconstruction, ended up getting lost and never arriving at Intermountain.
f25. The closure of the off-ramp, coupled with the change in configuration, denied
reasonable access to the Affected Property and substantially damaged the value of
Plaintiffs property in an amount to be proven at trial but currently calculated to be in
excess of $2,000,000.00.
TJ26. The City constructed the Circuitous Loop in such a manner that other businesses
obtained direct access to 4500 South off-ramp traffic, who otherwise benefitted from
the loss to Intermountain.
f 27. Such action by the Defendants became tantamount to a taking of the property for
the good of others and at the expense of Intermountain without just compensation.

*

M

f 31 — Defendants took or impaired Plaintiffs substantial property right for a public
use without just compensation."
(R. 5-7, 8, Addendum Exhibit 3,ffi[18-27, 31)
Appellant thereby alleged two types of "takings: (1) a "substantial interference" with
the operation of its commercial enterprise which "destroyed or materially lessened its value"
in excess of $2 Million; and (2) a "substantial interference" with the operation of its
commercial enterprise by which Appellant's right to the "use and enjoyment" of its
commercial enterprise was substantially "abridged or destroyed" in excess of $2 Million.

I

First, the trial court erred by not applying the proper standard for motions for
judgment on the pleadings-and then it went on to mis-read Appellant's complaint as alleging
merely a temporary denial of physical access. The court should have accepted all factual
allegations and all reasonable inferences therefrom as true, and should have denied UDOTfs
motion. Houghton v. Dept. of Health. 2002 UT 101, ^[2,57 P.3d 1067; Colman v. Utah State
Land Board. 795 P.2d 622. 624 (Utah 1990V
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Second, the trial court erred by relying on Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989), in which the closing of North Temple to re-route
floodwaters caused loss ofbusiness to abutting commercial enterprises. Reliance on that case
was inappropriate on several grounds: (1) In Rocky Mountain, plaintiffs merely alleged
interference with physical access, not interference with the right to use. Id. at 464-65. In fact,
the Supreme Court in Rocky Mountain cited favorably to this court's Three D decision,
discussed in Part LA. above, which made that critical distinction. Id. Appellant here, in
contrast, claims recompense for the taking of the right to use. (2) The plaintiffs in Rocky
Mountain did not allege, and therefore the court did not consider, a narrow characterization
of the relevant property. By comparison, in Colman, the court upheld the narrow
characterization of the relevant property as 300 feet of the 5-mile long canal. Thus, it is up
to the claimant to properly allege a narrow definition of the relevant property—whether
physically defined as in Colman, or conceptually defined as the right to use, as Appellant
alleged here. (3) In Rocky Mountain, the city responded to an emergency; the city had to act
quickly to save plaintiffs and the public from imminent flooding damage. See Colman v.
Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 628-29 (Utah 1990)(distinguishing "emergency"
cases). In contrast, UDOT here was engaged in highway reconstruction that was years in the
planning and execution. (4) In Rocky Mountain, plaintiffs' harm was mitigated by the fact
that the city blocked off physical access only for 6 months. In contrast, UDOT interfered with
Appellant's right to use its land for 4 years. (5) Rocky Mountain is fundamentally suspect
because it relied on Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100,349 P.2d 157 (1960),
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which held that Art. I, §22 was not self-executing, a determination expressly overruled by
I
Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P.2d 622,632 (Utah 1990). (6) Rocky Mountain also
is suspect because it relied on Bailey Service & Supply Corp. v. State Road Commission, 533
P.2d 882 (Utah 1975), in which the court held that if construction occurred entirely on public
property, no taking could occur. In Colman, which involved the state's breach of a causeway
owned by a public utility (railroad) to reduce the level of the Great Salt Lake, the Supreme

4

Court overruled that foundation for Bailey Service.
C.

UDOT's reconstruction of 1-15 caused a taking for a "public use" of Appellant's
right to use its land for operation of a commercial enterprise

I

The trial court concluded Appellant had no constitutionally protected property right
and that there was no "taking," so it did not determine whether the taking alleged was for a
I
"public use." Since it will be an issue on remand, however, this court should address it.
Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. Insure-Rite. Inc.. 2001 UT App 347, ^26, 37 P.3d 1202 (court
4
has duty to pass on issues that may become material on remand).
A "public use" for purposes of a "taking" claim is one which "will promote the public
interest, and which use tends to develop the great natural resources of the commonwealth."

I

Nash v.Clark, 27 Utah 158,75 P. 371 (1904)(irrigation ditches): see also Highland Boy Gold
Min. Co. v. Strickley. 28 Utah 215, 78 P. 296 (1904)(roads and tramways for mining
industry); cf. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff. 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984)("public use" is
coterminous with police powers). In Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622 (Utah
i
1990), the Court equated "public use" with "legitimate governmental objectives," such as
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A governmental taking incident to reconstruction of freeways is a "public use." UTAH
CODE ANN.

§§72-5-103(1 )(UDOT authority to "acquire any real property or interests in real

property necessary for temporary, present, or reasonable future state transportation purposes
by gift, agreement, exchange, purchase, condemnation, or otherwise."); 78-34l(6)(acquisition of property for roads is "public use"); 78-34-3(6)(all classes of private
property may be taken for public use). Appellant properly alleged that the taking of its
property resultedfromUDOT's reconstruction of I-15. (R. 5-7,8, Addendum Exhibit 3, Iff 1827, 32 ("...Defendants1 [conduct] was based on a public purpose to expand 1-15 to reduce
traffic impediments and safety concerns along 1-15..."))
D.

Appellant's loss of business resulting from UDOTs closure of the 45th South
offramp for about 4 years during the 1-15 reconstruction was legally cognizable
"harm" which, if a jury so determines, is compensable
Appellant alleged business loss as the harm caused by UDOT. (R. 6, 9, Addendum

Exhibit 3,ffl[25,37) The trial court concluded as a matter of law that Appellant's loss of
business was not compensable harm. See (R. 290, Addendum Exhibit 2, p.6, f 16)
First, the trial court again erred by not applying the proper standard for motions for
judgment on the pleadings; it should have accepted all factual allegations and all reasonable
inferences therefrom as true and denied UDOTs motion. Houghton v. Dept. of Health. 2002
UT 101, «p, 57 P.3d 1067; Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah
1990); c£, The View Condominium Owners Ass'n v. MSICO. L.L.C.. 2004 UT App at f 36
(summary judgment reversed; whether taking occurred is question of material fact).
Second, the trial court erred as a matter of substantive law. The drafters of the Utah
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Constitution intended that a jury determine whether the state has imposed compensable
"harm/1 See Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention, 327 (1898)(ff...the
means of arriving at the estimate are within the knowledge of men and can be adduced before
a jury.M)(Lorin Farr)(Addendum Exhibit 4). Thus, the question of harm should have been left
to ajury.
This court has recently noted that federal Just Compensation law may be instructive
in t he d evelopment o f U tah J ust C ompensation 1 aw, D iamond B -Y R anches v. T ooele
County, 2004 UT App 135, | 1 4 n.2. The United States Supreme Court has held that apartial
taking may be compensable, so that even if land has not been deprived of aU economically
beneficial use, an analysis of several factors can be used to determine whether an interference
is so great that compensation nevertheless is required. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533
U.S. 606, 617 (2001)(MThe economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations... [and] the character of the governmental action" are factors considered in the
latter kind of cases, citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)). The United States Supreme Court also has upheld ajury trial of federal takings
claims. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
Accordingly, the trial court on remand could instruct the jury pursuant to the Penn Central
factors for determining the takings question.
Third, it appears that the trial court confused Appellant's property right to use its land
to run a lawful business, with the measure of recovery for harm caused by UDOTs
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infringement of that right. Loss of business, typically measured as net lost profits, is the
measure of recovery for unlawful infringement of the right to use land to operate a business.
See, e.g.. Canyon Country Store v. Bracev, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989)(right to use
commercial tractor trailer); Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co.; 722 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986)(right
to operate business for distribution of coal trailers; net profits not shown); Cook Associates,
Inc. v. Warnich 664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1983)(right to use explosives plant); State Road Coirin
v. Rozzelle, 101 Utah 464, 120 P.2d 276 (1941)(recovery for loss of business denied; no
foundational property right alleged).
E.

UDOT's closure of the 45th South offramp for about 4 years during the 1-15
reconstruction "caused" Appellant's harm which, if a jury so determines,
renders UDOT liable for the resulting harm
The trial court did not reach the issue of causation, but since it will arise on remand,

this court should address it. Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. Insure-Rite, Inc., 2001 UT App 347,
f26, 37 P.3d 1202 (court has duty to pass on issues that may become material on remand).
Appellant properly alleged a !,taking,f for "public use" caused Appellants harm. (R.
5-7, Addendum Exhibit 3, f|18-27(alleging actions by UDOT and resulting harm to
Appellant; f 3 5(ff injury to Intermountain was the unavoidable result of the City and UDOTfs
action")). As a threshold matter, the trial court erred by not applying the proper standard for
motions for judgment on the pleadings. It should have accepted all factual allegations and
all reasonable inferences therefrom as true, and should have denied UDOTs motion.
Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2002 UT 101, \2, 57 P.3d 1067; Colman v. Utah State Land
Board, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990).
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As a matter of substance, compensable harm is that which is a "direct and necessary
consequence" of the 1-15 reconstruction. Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County. 2002 UT
17, f28,42 P.3d 379. Appellant alleged such a causal connection. (R. 5-7, Addendum Exhibit
3,ffi[18-27)."Intent is not an element of [an inverse condemnation] action." Farmers New
World Life Insurance Co. v. Biountiful City. 803 P.2d at 1246. The drafters of Utah's Just
Compensation Clause were well aware that unintentionally-caused harm also should be

|

compensable. Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention, 327
(1898)("Damage is not always—in fact is not often contemplated or expected. It comes

i
unlooked for as the consequence of an act which the party performs.")(Samuel R.
ThurmanXAddendum Exhibit 4).
In the final analysis, the question of causation is one of fact for the jury, as the drafters
also recognized. See id., ("...the means of arriving at the estimate are within the knowledge
of men and can be adduced before a jury.")
F.

g

The jury also may offset any special benefits Appellant derived from the project
The drafters of the Utah Constitution were well aware that compensation paid for
4

harm caused by public projects has commensurate fiscal impacts on governments.
Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention, 327-28 (1898)(Dennis Clay
EichnorXAddendum Exhibit 4). Thus, the drafters understood that such projects confer
special benefits as well as impose special costs, so the drafters provided that a jury would
offset such benefits against such costs. See id., 328 ("Of course,... whatever benefit results
by reason of [an] improvement is set off against the damage that is caused, and in that way
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the public gets absolute justice in relation to the matter... .")(Franklin S. Richards).
The principle of offsetting benefits against harms from public improvements is well
established in the law. In the analogous area of county and city improvement districts, special
benefits conferred by public projects are traditionally offset against special harm suffered.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§§ 17A-3-201 et seq. (counties); §§ 17A-3-301 et seq. (cities). Examples

of such projects include reconstruction, maintenance and repair of streets, crosswalks and
alleys. UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-3-204(l)(c)(counties); § 17A-3-304(l)(c)(cities). Local
governments may impose charges for infrastructure improvements on landowners specially
benefitted by those improvements, but only "to the extent of the benefits to the property by
reason of the improvements... ." UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-3-216(l)(counties); § 17A-3316(l)(cities). A landowner owner may contest before a board of equalization both whether
benefits (or harms) have been imposed, and the amount of such benefits (or harms). UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 17A-3-217(5)(counties); § 17A-3-317(5)(cities). The boards1 determinations

are subject to judicial review. UTAHCODEANN. § 17A-3-229(counties); § 17A-3-330(cities).
The issues at the heart of special improvement district settings and in takings settings
are strikingly similar: Which of the impacts on the landowner resulting from the public
project are properly characterized as "benefits" and which are "harms"? And of such benefits
and harms, which are "special"-uniquely affecting the landowner--as opposed to "publicscommon to the entire community? See 4 Sands, Libonati & Martinez, LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW, §§24.23-24.24 (identification of private benefits and apportionment of special
assessments). The jury on remand in this case would be required to determine the unique
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harm imposed on Appellant from the 1-15 reconstruction and to deduct the benefits, if any,
I
uniquely conferred on Appellant from the project. That would simply be the mirror image
of the special improvement district setting, in which the special benefits conferred on
landowners—and therefore the assessments imposed—are reduced by the special harm
suffered as a result of construction of the improvements involved.
II, UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS CLAIM:

<

UDOT UNLAWFULLY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST APPELLANT
A.

The statutes from which UDOT draws its power to construct freeways and
authorize U DOT t o d ictate t he m anner i n w hich such c onstruction w ill b e
performed are "laws" which were applied non-uniformly by UDOT, violating
Appellant's right to Uniform Operation of Laws

4

The trial court concluded that the statutes from which UDOT draws its power to
i
construct freeways and authorize UDOT to dictate the manner in which such construction
will be performed are not "laws" applied non-uniformly by UDOT. (R. 291, Addendum
i

Exhibit 2, p.7, f 19)
First, it is unequal treatment that therightto the Uniform Operation of Laws prohibits.
Article I Section 24 embodies the principle that "persons similarly situated should be treated
similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if their
circumstances were the same." UTAH CONST, ART. I, §24("A11 laws of a general nature shall
have uniform operation."); Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (1984). The plain terms of
Article I Section 24 provide a right to be free from unlawful discriminatory treatment in the
"operation" of laws. State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, fl2, 63 P.3d 667. And the Utah
Supreme Court hasDigitized
emphasized
thatW.the
focus
of theJ. Reuben
Uniform
Laws
protection
is on unequal
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Law Library,
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treatment: the provision "guards against disparate effects in the application of laws." Gallivan
v. Walker. 2002 UT 89, f38, 54 P.3d 1069; Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah
1993)("The legislature has considerable discretion in the designation of classifications but
the court must determine whether such classifications operate equally on all persons similarly
situated.").
The United States Supreme Court similarly has held that the federal Equal Protection
Clause restricts not just legislative action, but also administrative action implementing
legislation. Nordlinger v. Hahn. 505 U.S. 1, 16 n.8 (1992)(Equal Protection Clause
applicable to both legislative and administrative action); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
County Comm'n of Webster Cty.. 488 U.S. 336, 338 (1989)(county tax assessor's
administrative action in valuation of real property, pursuant to power conferred by general
state tax statutes to conduct such assessments, violated Equal Protection).
Appellant alleged there were other businesses similarly situated to Appellant which
also depended on the 45th South offramp. (R. 6, Addendum Exhibit 3, f26). Appellant
further alleged that "... UDOT ... discriminated against Plaintiff in violation of Article I,
Section 24 of the Utah Constitution, by among other things, arbitrarily and capriciously
providing [those other similarly situated] businesses" with accommodations not provided to
Appellant-including diversion of traffic to provide such businesses with continued access
to the 45th South offramp—and that such discriminatory treatment was "unreasonable and...
not for a legitimate legislative purpose." (R. 10, Addendum Exhibit 3, ^fl[39, 40). Such
allegations sufficiently state a claim for denial of uniform operation of laws by alleging that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

persons situated similarly to Appellant were treated more favorably than Appellant, without
a reasonable legislative objective to warrant such discrimination. Arndt v. First Interstate
Bank of Utah, N. A.. 1999 UT 9142,991 P.2d 584 (reasonable inferences must be drawn in
favor of Plaintiff); Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light. 969 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah

i

1998)(pleadings need only give fair notice).
Second, discrimination is unlawful under the Uniform Laws prohibition if it is

|

undertaken pursuant to governmental authority. And there is no doubt that UDOT acted
under governmental authority here. UDOT is a creature of statute. Cf. Faux v. Mickelsen.
i
725 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1986)(small claims court is creature of statute). The "law" alleged by
Appellant as having nonuniform operation consists of the statutes from which UDOT draws
- its power to construct freeways and authorize UDOT to dictate the manner in which such

*

construction will be performed. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § § 72-6-101 - -119("Construction,
Maintenance, and Operations" of state highways by UDOT)(Addendum Exhibit 1)
B.

Appellant's allegation that UDOT unlawfully discriminated against Appellant
by arbitrarily and capriciously providing other businesses similarly situated to
Appellant with accommodations not provided to Appellant sufficiently alleges
membership in an identifiable class for purposes of Appellant's Uniform
Operation of Laws claim

.

<

The trial court erroneously concluded Appellant was not a member of an "identifiable
class" for purposes of the right to Uniform Laws. (R. 291, Addendum Exhibit 2, p.7, ^fl9)

*

The first type of protection provided by the Uniform Laws provision is that members
of the same class—by definition similarly situated—must be treated the same. Malan v. Lewis,
693 P.2d 661,670 (1984)(" Article I, §24 protects against two types of discrimination. First,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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•1 I in nmisl applh, npuilh In ill |HM SOU* n ullim a i II. IUS "I \ ppellant alleged, there were other
businesses similarly situated to Appellant which also depended on the 45th South offramp.
(R 6, Addendum Exhibit 3, f 26). Appellant thereby alleged a "class" whose members were
' J'••

similarly situated

'

:

'

":'

• " ' ' " ' "^: * • ' " '

' ' " '' '

• ' - •• '

of Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution, by among other things, arbitrarily and
capriciously providing [those other similarly situated] businesses" with accommodations not
muled In \ ppi liitnl IIK In

ISIOII

nl In lilii In | HI iii Hihi Ill iiich business" \ulh-

continued access to the 45th South offramp~and that such discriminatory 'treatment was
"unreasonable and

not foi a legitimate legislative purpose, 11 (R. 10, Addendum, Exhibit 3,

1J1H9, -40) P r o l i a n t thereby allowed in i d c n ^ n h l r -lass- and tb- + ^ D O ^ fronted the
.t
J

- •> •

lember
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• •••* * :

•

•
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* oi Uniiuim Laws violation. Ma]an i. t ev\ i > O 9 J F.2d al 070.
The second type of protection provided by the IJ niform Laws provision is that if

members of the same class-by definition similarly situated—are treated differently,, then "the
different tiraliiiiinitl p m n lln i lasses miiil \^ I U M J I i IIHIHI'IK'IM. ilmi h.m> ,i ii>,Knii,<hK'
tendency to fui ther the objectives of the statute. MuLi-

..-. ± JI>, o y i r .2d ai 0 70. Ana that

protection applies even if only one membci of the class ib singled jut : J I uniavoi-'-.e
treatment, as in this case. Id. ("When persons are similarly situated,.,, it is unconstitutional to
single out c •iiepei sc r

from

among a largei class

')
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Appellant alleged that UDOT singled out appellant for less favorable treatment than
other similarly situated businesses, and that such discriminatory treatment was "unreasonable
and ... not for a legitimate legislative purpose." (R. 10, Addendum Exhibit 3,1fl[39, 40).
Appellant therefore properly stated a claim of the "second type" of Uniform Laws violation.
Malan v.Lewis. 693 P.2dat670 (1984). Appellant's "second type" claim had two alternative
components: that there was no legitimate governmental objective for the classification
imposing the disparate treatment, and that even if there were, the classification imposing the
disparate treatment was unreasonable because it did not "have a reasonable tendency to
further" such legitimate governmental objective. Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d at 670.
.

CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the final judgment by the trial court and remand the case
for further proceedings. UDOT should be taxed with costs on appeal.
DATED this J P _ day of May, 2004.
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ADDENDUM
Exhibit 1:

UTAH CODE ANN;

§ § 72- o i 01 . . .

Exhibit 2:

Final Order of the Hoiionible William B. Bohling entered on December
11, 2003, granting UDOTs Motion for Judgment on the * ladings

I " i l l I ill i n II I '

l ' i i 11 i p I i in i ill I

-Exhibit 4:

Excerpts: Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Com mention
(1898)(pp. 326-29, 333, 336-37, 625-26)
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; iAc 72. Transportation *. ode
Chapter 6. Construction, Maintenance, and Operations72 • 6-101 Title. -' ^'-:'
"
This chapter is known as the "Construction, Maintenance, and Operations A ct "

;: :i :

* "

The department shall:
(1) prepare and adopt uniform standard plans and specifications for the construction and
maintenance of state highways; and
(2) issue a manual containing plans and specifications for the information and guidance of
officials having supervision of the construction and maintenance of state highways. '
72-6-103 Plans, specifications, and estimates foi ciil i ei ts, bridges, and i • >
: \I
construction.
The department shah
i.
{•• • i I^UIK i..s, and estimates for culverts, bridges, •'
road construction, and otlu. > . I »u \ • i mation desired by local highway authorities for
use on county roads and city streets on terms mutually agreed upon.
72-6-104 Highways to conform to grade and direction in municipalities.
Except for the highways part of the interstate system, a highway that extends through a
municipality shall conform to the direction and grade of other streets in the municipality
unless permission is obtained from the highway aiith^,Hi"- '•'"<^- ivnnirjpa^l ft™
variance in the direction and grade
72-6-105 Contracts for construction and maintenance —Agreements with county or
municipality.
The department may enter into written agreements on behalf of the state with any county
or municipality for rights-of-way and'the construction or maintenance of any part of a ''
state highway:
(1) at the expense of the state;
(2) at the expense of any county or muiiic1 \\\ !•t »i
(3) at the joint expense of the state and any count}' and an} municipal" „
72-6-106 Use of recycled asphalt
(1) In making plans, specifications, ar.u
cs, and m ud\ ortising for bids unde i this
chapter, the department shall allow up u
nut ma\ allow up to 60% reclain i ;> :! asphalt
linl
?t;
paver™ *nt ^> !^ Digitized
mr<>mnr;iioH
into
^•^'.! * ^-^« >• **«*<*forroad coiisti i i :ti :: ii and
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maintenance.
i
(2) The department shall ensure that hot asphaltic concrete incorporating reclaimed
asphalt pavement meets or exceeds the department quality standards for roads constructed
or maintained with hot asphaltic concrete not containing reclaimed asphalt pavement.
(3) If the department rejects any hot asphaltic concrete containing reclaimed asphalt
pavement, the department shall give a written statement to the provider indicating the
specific reasons the hot asphaltic concrete was rejected.
(4) This section does not authorize the state to directly or indirectly subsidize the
production of hot asphaltic concrete containing reclaimed asphalt pavement.
72-6-107 Construction or improvement of highway —Contracts —Retainage.
(1) (a) The department shall make plans, specifications, and estimates prior to the
construction or improvement of any state highway.
(b) Except as provided in Section 63-56-36.1 and except for construction or
improvements performed with state prison labor, a construction or improvement project
with an estimated cost exceeding the bid limit as defined in Section 72-6-109 for labor
and materials shall be performed under contract awarded to the lowest responsible bidder.
(c) The advertisement for bids shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in
the county in which the work is to be performed, at least once a week for two consecutive
weeks, with the last publication at least ten days before bids are opened.
(d) The department shall receive sealed bids and open the bids at the time and place
designated in the advertisement. The department may then award the contract but may
reject any and all bids.
(e) If the department's estimates are substantially lower than any responsible bid received,
the department may perform any work by force account.
(2) If any payment on a contract with a private contractor for construction or
improvement of a state highway is retained or withheld, the payment shall be retained or
withheld and released as provided in Section 13-8-5.
(3) If the department performs a construction or improvement project by force account,
the department shall:
(a) provide an accounting of the costs and expenditures of the improvement including
material and labor;
(b) disclose the costs and expenditures to any person upon request and allow the person to
make a copy and pay for the actual cost of the copy; and
(c) perform the work using the same specifications and standards that would apply to a
private contractor.
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(4) In <v eonlance with utic o.;, v uapit . \
..HH-JIM.
ikpaiimeni shall establish procedures iot
{&) hearing evidence that a region witlim the de|
t violated this section, aid
(b) administering sanctions against the region if the regh >n is found m \ lolauon.
72 6-108 Class B and C roads -Improvement projects -Contracts — Retainage,
I 1) A county executive for class B roads and the municipal executive for class C roads
shall cause plans, specifications, and estimates to be made prior to the construction
improvement project, as defined in Section 72-6-109, on a class B or C road il the
estimated cost for any one project exceeds the bid limit as defined in Section 72-6-109 for
:
labor, equipment, and materials.
.
'^ •
'"':
•
(2) (a) All projects in excess of the bid limit shall be performed under control f o be let to
the lowest responsible bidder
(b) If the estimated cost of the improvement project exceeds the bid limn ioi
equipment, and materials, the project may not be divided to permit the const •
parts, unless each part is done by contract.
f ? J '1 he advertisement on bids shall be published in a newspaper of general • ulation in
the county in which the work is to he performed at leaM nr» e i week lor three
iv-nsecutive weeks. If there ss no newspaper of general circulation, the notice Jiallbc
^ -i. d lor at lea.st 20 davs \r ! i<*;isl f\\ .* public places in the county.
^H; .lie counu u, municipal v.^v,uie*^ . i aiui viesigik., ..ii.ill eeci\c sealed • •. ^ im*i <-p-. a
the bids at the time and place designated in the advertisement Ihe county or municipal
executn e or then designee may then award the contract but mav reject anv and all bids*
(5) The persoi 1 v -j ,*orp« nation that is awarded a contract under this section is subject
u ihe provisions of Title o.*. rhaptei ISO, Utah Procurement Code.
(6) If any paymun wu t?* UJIU.K i with a private contractor for construction or
" 1
improvement of a class 13 or C road is retained or withheld, the payment sha •
or withheld and released as provided in Section 13-8-5,
72-6-109 Class B and C roads -Construction and maintenance - Definitions »
Estimates lower than bids—Accountability.
(1) As used in this section and Section 72-6-108:
(n\ lfRJ,| limit" means:
-

• 2003 $125,0

iii a 1 ••"

-^

• ' ' '

•

'

"; <>' '

• ' - •• •• •. "'

(ii) for each year after 2003, the amount of the bid limit fbi (lie pirvions vein phi:.1 :iii
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amount calculated by multiplying the amount of the bid limit for the previous year by the
lesser of 3% or the actual percent change in the Consumer Price Index during the
previous calendar year.
(b) "Consumer Price Index" means the Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Consumers as published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States
Department of Labor.
(c) (i) "Construction" means the work that would apply to:
(A) any new roadbed either by addition to existing systems or relocation;
(B) resurfacing of existing roadways with more than two inches of bituminous pavement;
or
(C) new structures or replacement of existing structures, except the replacement of
drainage culverts.
(ii) "Construction" does not include maintenance, emergency repairs, or the installation of
traffic control devices as described in Section 41-6-20.
(d) "Improvement project" means construction and maintenance as defined in this section
except for that maintenance excluded under Subsection (2).
(e) "Maintenance" means the keeping of a road facility in a safe and usable
condition to which it was constructed or improved, and includes:
(i) the reworking of an existing surface by the application of up to and including two
inches of bituminous pavement;
(ii) the installation or replacement of guardrails, seal coats, and culverts;
(iii) the grading or widening of an existing unpaved road or flattening of shoulders or side
slopes to meet current width and safety standards; and
(iv) horizontal or vertical alignment changes necessary to bring an existing road in
compliance with current safely standards.
(f) "Project" means the performance of a clearly identifiable group of associated road
construction activities or the same type of maintenance process, where the construction or
maintenance is performed on any one class B or C road, within a half-mile proximity and
occurs within the same calendar year.
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(l) i h e following types of man *<
requirements of this section:
(a) the repair of less than 'the entire surface by crack sealing or patching; and
(b) road repairs incidental lo ihr installation, replacement, or repair of water mains,
sewers, drainage pipes, culverts, or curbs and gutters,
(3) (a) (i) If the estimates of a qualified engineer refen ed to in Section 72 6 108 ai e
substantially lower than any responsible bid received or in the event no bids ai e receii 'ed
the county or municipality may perform the work by force account.
(Yi) Tn no e^eni shall "substantially lower" mean estimates thai are less than 10% below
thr lowest responsible hid.
• , ;\:.

,• ,:^au

an impro\ emem pi o ; i,,; ^. force account, it shall:

(i) provide an accountm^ ,n .he eosis a;;a expenditures u inc. linpi-1 < ement
including nmlenal, labor, and direct equipment costs to he calculated using the Cost
Reterence Guide for Constiuetion liquipnient b) DataqueslL^.,
UH disclose the costs and expenditures to any person upon request and allow the person to
make a copy and pa} for the actual i o;,i -fllie enpv, an{C) p e i u r m I U * - ; ,. ... ~
private contractor.

r-

.

=•; I

a

(4) In accordant ; w n\\ Title *\:-. Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the
department shall establish procedures t(?
(a) hearing evidence thai a n don >A ith = n (he department violated this section; and

72- 6-108 Class B and C roads —Imps ..\ cmiut j , . .>, . . i ,/iui .<
(1) A county executh e for class B road* and the mum \Vd\ execute.
s
shall cause plans, specifications, and estimates u* be made pn*>? to the construction ul any
improvement project, as defined in Section ~^J •' ': W, * >a a .'la>s B . road if the
estimated cost ioi air. win; pioject exceeds tin i:.** inn ; .iehned m Section "2-f> 10^ for
labor, equipment, m-' maten iK

the lowest responsible oiddes
(b) 1 f the estimated cost of the improvement pro|ect exceeds the bid 1m- »
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equipment, and materials, the project may not be divided to permit the construction in
parts, unless each part is done by contract.

i

(3) The advertisement on bids shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in
the county in which the work is to be performed at least once a week for three
consecutive weeks. If there is no newspaper of general circulation, the notice shall be
posted for at least 20 days in at least five public places in the county.

'

(4) The county or municipal executive or their designee shall receive sealed bids and open
the bids at the time and place designated in the advertisement. The county or municipal
executive or their designee may then award the contract but may reject any and all bids.

.

(5) The person, firm, or corporation that is awarded a contract under this section is subject
to the provisions of Title 63, Chapter 56, Utah Procurement Code.
(6) If any payment on a contract with a private contractor for construction or
improvement of a class B or C road is retained or withheld, the payment shall be retained
or withheld and released as provided in Section 13-8-5.
72-6-109 Class B and C roads —Construction and maintenance — Definitions —
Estimates lower than bids—Accountability.
(1) As used in this section and Section 72-6-108:
(a) "Bid limit1' means:

<

*

(i) for the year 2003, $125,000; and
(ii) for each year after 2003, the amount of the bid limit for the previous year, plus an
amount calculated by multiplying the amount of the bid limit for the previous year by the
lesser of 3% or the actual percent change in the Consumer Price Index during the
previous calendar year.

<

(b) "Consumer Price Index" means the Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Consumers as published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States
Department of Labor.
i

(c) (i) "Construction" means the work that would apply to:
(A) any new roadbed either by addition to existing systems or relocation;
(B) resurfacing of existing roadways with more than two inches of bituminous pavement;
or
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(C) new structures oi icplanitiinil ol c\is1in|» shut tun i, e\n pi llic irplacvincnl iif • •'• ^' ''
drainage culverts.
(IP) "Construction11 does not include maintenance, emergency repairs, or the installation of
Iral'fic control devices as described in Section41-6-20. -:: •' •
^-,
(d) "Improvement project" means con
except for that mainten'vv*" -,x -h*Ar- *

*"^ce as defined in 1 his section

(e) "Maintenance" means the keeping of a road facility in a safe and usable •
condition to which it was constructed or improved, and includes:

•

:

(i) the reworking of an existing surface K flu applieaflwi Tup fo and inrudiug t ^
inches of bituminous pavement,
v<-

:\

h

*•

v

. -

.. .1 .

• -

i

- •

- ,;

•, n; i ihe grading or w idrning .M an existing unpaved road oi iiattenimr -x-f shouideia vi side
slopes to meet current width and safety standards; and
•'
••
r:

~* horizontal or vertical alignment changes necessary to bring an existing road in -:
,. • •mpliance W:th current sairU standards.

{!) "Project" ii«caurt iiiv. pei iwmkin^ of a clearly identil i,ir «•: i iuup ui assoc*ah u IUUU
construction activities or the same type of maintenance process, where the construction or
maintenance is performed on any one class B or C road, within a half-mile proximity and
occurs within the same calendar year.
(2) The following types of maintenance work arc not subject U> flic confraci .> hi-,' *' \ <r'
requirements of this section:
(a) the repair of less than the entire surface by crack sealing or patching; and
"'.' : •-'.(b) road repaii.s tuc idcnial io the installation, replacemcnl, or irpjiir ofwalki mams,"
sewers, drainau** pipes, culverts, or curbs and gutters.
(3) (a) (i) If the estimates of a qualified engineer referred to in Section 72- 6-1 OS arc
substantially lower than any responsible bid received or in the event no bids are received,
the county or municipality may perform the work by force account.
(ii, MI no event shall "substantial!) lo v * • n r mean estimates that are less than 1 0% below
the lowest responsible bid.
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(b) If a county or municipality performs an improvement project by force account, it shall:
(i) provide an accounting of the costs and expenditures of the improvement
including material, labor, and direct equipment costs to be calculated using the Cost
Reference Guide for Construction Equipment by Dataquest Inc.;
(ii) disclose the costs and expenditures to any person upon request and allow the person to
make a copy and pay for the actual cost of the copy; and
(iii) perform the work using the same specifications and standards that would apply to a
private contractor.

4

72-6-110 Supervision and standards of construction for class B and C roads.
(1) All construction plans, specifications, aind estimates and all construction work under
Section 72-6-108 shall be prepared and performed under the direct supervision of a
registered professional engineer.

^

(2) The supervising engineer shall certify to the county legislative body or the municipal
executive that all road construction projects conform to design and construction standards
as currently adopted by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation
officials.
72-6-111 Construction and maintenance of appurtenances —Noise abatement
measures.
(1) The department is authorized to construct and maintain appurtenances along the state
highway system necessary for public safety, welfare, and information. Appurtenances
include highway illumination, sidewalks, curbs, gutters, steps, driveways, retaining walls,
fire hydrants, guard rails, noise abatement measures, storm sewers, and rest areas.
(2) A noise abatement measure may only be constructed by the department along a
highway when:
(a) the department is constructing a new state highway or performing major
reconstruction on an existing state highway;

^

<

(b) the Legislature provides an appropriation or the federal government provides funding
for construction of retrofit noise abatement along an existing state highway; or
(c) the cost for the noise abatement measure is provided by citizens, adjacent property
owners, developers, or local governments.
(3) In addition to the requirements under Subsection (2), the department may only
construct noise abatement measures within the unincorporated area of a county or within
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I

. .„,;,..,ipaiity that has an ordinance or general plan that requires:
(a) a study to be conducted to determine the noise levels along new development .iiljiu nil
to an existing state highway or a dedicated right-of-way; and
(b) the construction of noise abatement measures at the expense of the developer if
required, to be constructed under standards established by a rule of the depann T +
v-ry

IU accordance with Iltlc w.>, Chapter 4(111, I H.ili Admmntrntirr Mulcinakhij.- Ai I, (In
department shall make rules establishing:
(a) when noise abatement measures are required to be constructed, including standards for
decibel levels of traffic noise;
(b) the decibel level of traffic noise which identifies the projects to be programmed by the'
commission for the earliest construction of retrofit noise abatement measures funded
under Subsection (2)(b) based on availability of funding; and
(c) a priority system, for the construction of other retrofit noise abatement measures that
meet or exceed the standards established under this section and are funded under
Subsection (2)(b) which includes:
•''' •
(i) the number of residential dwellings adversely affected by the traffic noise;
HI

" i 'In I'OSI elk 1 " li\ enoii.s oi mitigating the traffic noise; and

(iii) the length u. nine i:;c j ^ ; t . ^ ; IL*^I -.fir:!l !i
the standards established under this seuiun.
72 -6-112 Traffic Noise Abatement Progran

•• '; '""'
ii

= ^d« 1

I scv

(1) There is created the Traffic Noise Abatem.-?'" r r o g u n n .

•*•>'••.••••

•

-

(2) The program consists ofm.oni.es generated from the following revenue sources: ••
(a) any voluntary contributions received for traffic noise abatement; and
(b) appropriations made to the program by the I ,egislaiure.
(3) The department shall use program monies as j u tut .uzeu by the commission and as
provided by law for the study, design, construction, and maintenance of noise abatement
measures.
(4) All f ending foi the Traffic Noise Abatement Piugi^n. ^u11 V- nonlapsing.
72-6-113 Acquisition and improvement 0f i an( j for preservation of scenic beauty —
Authority of department.
(1) T h e d e p a r t m e n t is a u t h o i i / c d U\ ;iu|iiiu MI id "input 1 r sli "|u< nf I mi I necessity l<if <l1"
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restoration, preservation, and enhancement of scenic beauty within and adjacent to a
federal-aid highway of this state, including acquisition of publicly owned and controlled
rest and recreation areas, sanitary, and other facilities within or adjacent to the highway
right-of-way reasonably necessary to accommodate the traveling public.

i

(2) Acquisition may be by gift, purchase, or exchange but may not be by condemnation.
(3) The interest in any land authorized to be acquired and maintained under this section
may be fee simple or any lesser interest, as determined by the department to be reasonably
necessary to accomplish the purposes of this section.
(4) (a) Real property, or any interest in real property, acquired under this section is part of
the adjacent or nearest highway and is under the jurisdiction of the department.
(b) The department may enter into an agreement with any state agency for maintenance of
land acquired in accordance with this section.
{

72-6-114 Restricting use of or closing highway —Penalty for failure to observe
barricade, warning light, etc,
(1) A highway authority may close or restrict travel on a highway under their jurisdiction
due to construction, maintenance work, or emergency.
(2) If a highway or portion of a highway is closed or restricted to travel, a highway
authority shall cause suitable barriers and notices to be posted and maintained in
accordance with Section 41-6-20.
(3) A person who willfully fails to observe any barricade, warning light, sign, or flagman,
used in accordance with this section, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
72-6-115 Traffic Management Committee —Appointment —Duties.
(1) As used in this section, "committee" means the Traffic Management Committee
created in this section.
(2) (a) There is created within the Department of Transportation the Traffic Management
Committee comprising up to 13 members laiowledgeable about traffic engineering, traffic
flow, air quality, or intelligent transportation systems as follows:

<

{

(i) two members designated by the executive director of the department;
(ii) one member designated by the Utah Association of Counties;
(iii) one member designated by the Department of Environmental Quality;
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1 mi ' 1 Hir nicinbii ni lir'sijijiiilcd h y IIIIIH; W i n iiicli h u m Regional \ "oiinal,

;
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l^v) one member designated by the Mountainland Association :>f Governme nts;
(vi) one member designated by the Commissioner of Public Safety; and
'?; - ' •

I • ..; one member designated hy the I llali League of Cities and Towns;
^vmj one member designated by the general managei of a public transit ui , •
than 200,000 people residing within the public transit di.stri.ct boundaries;

M h more'

(ix) u p to four additional members designated by the committee for one-year terms, and
(X; a designating entity under Subsections (2)(a)(i) through fviiH may designate an
alt-.-mali1 e member to serve in the absence of its designated member,
(

ar .* , - , ,

(i; advise the department on matters related to the implementation ; i " -in :
this section;
(ii) make recommendations to law enforcement agencies related fo traffic flow and
incident management during heavy traffic periods;
(in; .«jhe P •< • • i .:>,A\* U, Hie tkpauifile saicty and u n M.HI y of highways usin,
including traffic signal coordination, tint!'
message signing, and incident management, and

-n an-> municipalities on incieasing
"lallie management systems,
ui, frerway ramp metering ^

(iv) evaluate the cost effectiveness of implementing a specific traffic management
on a highway considering:
(A)

»i«!»nr U:.1*

-

•

:

i;

(B) the necessity and potential of reducing vehicle emissions m the aiea,
( O the feasibilih ^filie traffic management system on the highway; and
(Dj

.^,.ici U.-MM

(c) The

i

.

;

^Higt.^ioi ^ ii1 be reduced b y the system.
; .

. -fiair and a vice chair from,, its members.
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(d) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any reason, the replacement shall be
appointed.
(e) The committee shall meet as it determines necessary to accomplish its duties.
(f) Reasonable notice shall be given to each member of the committee prior to any
meeting.
(g) A majority of the committee constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business.
(h) (i) (A) Members who are not government employees shall receive no
compensation or benefits for their services., but may receive per diem and expenses
incurred in the performance of the member's official duties at the rates established by the
Division of Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A- 3-107.
(B) Members may decline to receive per diem and expenses for their service.
(ii) (A) State government officer and employee members who do not receive salary, per
diem, or expenses from their agency for their service may receive per diem and expenses
incurred in the performance of their officml duties from the committee at the rates
established by the Division of Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107.
(B) State government officer and employee members may decline to receive per diem and
expenses for their service.
(iii) (A) Local government members who do not receive salary, per diem, or expenses
from the entity that they represent for their service may receive per diem and expenses
incurred in the performance of their official duties at the rates established by the Division
of Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63 A3-107. ...
.
(B) Local government members may decline to receive per diem and expenses for their service.
(3) (a) The Department of Transportation shall implement and administer traffic
management systems to facilitate the efficient flow of motor vehicle traffic on state
highways to improve regional mobility, and to reduce motor vehicle emissions where
those improvements are cost effective, as determined by the committee in accordance
with criteria under Subsection (2)(b).
(b) A traffic management system shall be designed to allow safe, efficient, and effective:
(i) integration of existing traffic management systems;
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jurisdiction;
(iii) incorporation of other traffic management systems; and
I < I adaptation l<> Indue Iraliic needs.

' •'•••

' • ; • :;

:

' '••• •• "' ' • • ^ , '•-' ':'; '' ' • - *

(4) (a) J he cost of implementing and administering a traffic management system *
shared pro rata by the department and the counties and municipalities using it
(b) The department shall enter into an agreement or contract under Title 11, Chapter 13,
Interlocal Cooperation Act, with a county or municipality to share costs incurred under
this section.
(5) Additional highways and intersections «m I' i H» adminislrii'
|
I "
I
county or municipality may be added In *i in iilin IIII mafniictif iv-ih in mjHiii .i|i|iliuiu in nil
the county or municipality after:
(a) a recommendation of the committee;
(b) approval by the department;
(c) determination of the appropriate cost share of the addition under ' ••'•"r;,'; ;:"
Subsection (4)(a); and
(jj

ail

agreement under SubseetH n (4YhY

(6) The committee may establish technical advisory coimmltees as needed to assist m
accomplishing its duties under this see;
72-6-116 Regulation of utilities —Relocation of utilities,
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Cost of relocation" includes the entire amount paiu i•; me utility company properly
attributable to the relocation of the utility after deducting any increase in the value of the
new utility and any salvage value derived from the old utility.
(b) "I Jtiiity" includes telecommunication, gas, electricity, cable television, water, sewer,
data, and video'transmission lines, drainage and irrigation systems, and other similar
utilities located in, on, along, across, over, through, or under any state highway
(., Utility company" means a privately, cooperatively, oi publicly owned
utility, including utilities owned by political subdivisions
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(2) (a) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act,
the department may make rules for the installation, construction, maintenance, repair,
renewal, system upgrade, and relocation of all utilities.
(b) If the department determines under the rules established in this section that it is
necessary that any utilities should be relocated, the utility company owning or operating
the utilities shall relocate the utilities in accordance with this section and the order of the
department.
(3) (a) The department shall pay 100% of the cost of relocation of a utility on a state
highwayif the:
:
(i) utility is owned or operated by a political subdivision of the state; or
(ii) utility company owns the easement or fee title to the right-of-way in which the utility
is located.
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(a) or (c), the department shall pay 50% of the
cost of relocation of a utility on a state highway and the utility company shall pay the
remainder of the cost of relocation.
(c) This Subsection (3) does not affect the provisions of Subsection 72-7- 108(5).
(4) If a utility is relocated, the utility company owning or operating the utility, its
successors or assigns, may maintain and operate the utility, with the necessary
appurtenances, in the new location.
(5) In accordance with this section, the cost of relocating a utility in connection with any
project on a highway is a cost of highway construction.
(6) (a) The department shall notify affected utility companies whenever the relocation of
utilities is likely to be necessary because of a reconstruction project.
(b) The notification shall be made during the preliminary design of the project or as soon
as practical in order to minimize the number, costs, and delays of
utility relocations.
(c) A utility company notified under this Subsection (6) shall coordinate with the
department and the department's contractor on the utility relocations, including the
scheduling of the utility reloczttions.
72-6-117 Limited-access facilities and service roads —Access —Right-of- way
acquisition —Grade separation —Written permission required.
(1) A highway authority, acting alone or in cooperation with the federal government,
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another highway authority, or another state may plan, designate, establish, regulate,
vacate, alter, improve, maintain, and provide a limited- access facility including a sex
road to the limited-access facility.
(2) A highway authoriU mav regulate, restrict oi piohll-r (he use of a limited-jocess
facility by pedestrians, animals, or by the various classes ol' vehicles CM *r:r•.
(3) A highway authority may divide and separate any limited-access iduiu v m S M ; roadways by the construction of raised curbing, central dividing sections, or other
physical separations, or by designating separate roadways by signs, markers, stripes, and
other appropriate devices.
(4N» A person ma> not enter, exit n «io>> a limited-access facility, except at designated
:>< -M«S ai which access is permitted In the highway authonl'
p , /i. Highway authority may acquire, by gift, devise, purchase,
or public property and property rights for a limited- access facility and service road,
including rights of access, air, view, and light. All property rights acquired under this
section may be m tee simple or in any lesser estate or interest A highway auth-nl
acquire an entm M ;.W I - traci ol i,.,:«i. if needed. e\ en though the entire iot. H* ly r
tract is not immediately needed for the right-of-way o! Use limited-access facility or
service road.
(6) A highw ajv mum
facilities or mav Ac^
facility.

^ i g n a t e and establish liiiiiUu-.K LDh m
.-» .1 establish an existing highw ^ ^^ n,|r< ^

* . new
-* i-mv-ess

\T\ fa) \ huilmny authority uu\ piovidr lor' me elimination oi ai grade intersection* of a
U? -ined-access facility and an existing highway by grade
M-istration, service road, or ^v closing the intersecting highway.
(b) A highway authority may not connect or intersect a limited-access facility without 'the
written consent and previous approval of the highway authority having jurisdiction over
the limited-access facility.
«T- Highway auihonue- ma\ enter into agreements with ea. I: .-the*. . \-uh ilv. federal
government <> •;.. financing, planning, establishment, improvement, maintenance tse,
umuiation, or \ M.-<\\U*\: o! limited-access facilities or oilier public ways in their respective
lunsdiction, to lacihtatc the pin poses H thi\ section
72-6-118 Definitions —Establishment and operatic! ii • c:i f tci Ill i i aj s
collection of tolls —Amount of tolls —Rulemaking
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(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Toll" means any tax, fee, or charge assessed for the specific use of a tollway.
(b) "Tollway" means a highway, highway lane, bridge, path, tunnel, or right-of- way
designed and used as a transportation route that is constructed, operated, or maintained
through the use of toll revenues.
(2) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (3), the department may:
(a) establish and operate tollways and related facilities for the purpose of
funding in whole or in part the acquisition of right-of-way and the design, construction,
reconstruction, operation, and maintenance of or impacts from a transportation route for
use by the public;
(b) enter into contracts, agreements, licenses, franchises, or other arrangements to
implement this section; and
(c) impose and collect tolls on any tollway established under this section.
(3) (a) The department or other entity may not establish or operate a tollway on a state
highway, except as approved by the commission and the Legislature.
(b) Between sessions of the Legislature, a state tollway may be designated or deleted if:
(i) approved by the commission in accordance with the standards made under this section;
and

<•

4

i

(ii) the tollways are submitted to the Legislature in the next year for legislative approval
or disapproval.
(c) In conjunction with a proposal submitted under Subsection (3)(b)(ii), the department
shall provide a description of the tollway project, projected traffic, the anticipated amount
of tolls to be charged, and projected toll revenue.
(4) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the
commission shall set the amount of any toll imposed or collected on a tollway on a state
highway.

^

<

(5) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the
department shall make rules necessary to establish and operate tollways on state
highways. The rules shall include minimum criteria for having a tollway.
(6) The commission may provide funds for public or private tollway pilot projects from
General Fund monies appropriated by the Legislature to the commission for that purpose.
(

72-6-119 "511" traveler information services —Lead agency — Implementation —
Cooperation —Rulemaking —Costs.
(1) As used in this section, "511" or "511 service" means three-digit telecommunications
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:»„i:i\y to access miciiig^n;
^UAJL^;
„: i^ i.iioima!nMi ser.Kw p.w uit.i
in the state in accordance with the Federal v^uimiiunications Commiaoion and Unitca
States Department of Transportation.
(2) The department is the state's lead agone> foi implementing 511 service and is tin
state's point of contact for coordinating % 1 I s e n ice with telecommunications s e m o
nroviders.
1 ,

» >V depart n mil shall 1

:• v.nplement and administer" 511 service in the state;
(b) coordinate with the highway authorities and public transit districts to p r o \ ' *
advanced multimodal traveler information throm-1 •*' sen u o and other means; am i
(c) in aceordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, "I
rules as necessary to implement this section.

*•.

: : i \ v \< 1111' 111 < i k n 11 j > A11, 111. t k 15

t4j (a) In accordance with i I!K ; \ « 'hapler I * inierh-- M i 'ooperation . u i Tie
department shall *IH--M inio agreements oi coniraeis wnh highway authorities and public
transit districts i<> share the /osts of implementing: and administering 511 service in the
state.
(by i lie department shall enter into other agreements or conu.n \^ icuumg iw u.sen-ice to offset the r<KK of implementing and administering % 1 ' ^ ^ **-** >••
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FILED DISTRICT 00URT
f

• N D Y S . HUNTER (9084)
STEVEN K. WALKENHORST (3356)
JONI J. JONES (7562)
Assistant Attorneys General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant UDOT
160 East 300 South Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah «S4n
Telephone: (801.1 Vi<>-0Hh)

•iJ-MM.
SALT L <\Kh ( ()l iN n

INTERMOUK 1 ' «N SPORT 1

Th!rd"JJudicial District

DEC 1 12003
TteputyCteJi

5.

COURT

SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, S TA IT OF I I \ l !

V

Plaintiff,
:
vs.
MURRAY CITY and UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

ORDER OKAiNilrNU I
I
DEPARTMENT O F
TRANSPORTATION'S MOTIONS
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS
Civil No.: 030917322 CD

:
Judge: William B. Bohling

Defendants.

.'.A^IDOU

:

i.

.in... .iii: heard ora! nrgument o r Defendant Utah Department

oi Transportation b motions io: indumen! i l!.. ! ..!-;.•

:

•

:

i

*•" nicy Gcnei.il. appealed on behalf ol 1 'tali Department of"Transportation ("I IIX T " ) and
•i! •"< •

'•

• "• '

i. I U U K M m c uiui eeoiK)i:;ie ;. iulions.

Randy S. Hunter, Assistant Utah Attorney General, appeared on behalf of UDOT and ai }.;ucd the
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motion to dismiss Plaintiffs remaining claims for inverse condemnation, breach of contract,
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of Article I, § 22 of the Utah
Constitution (labeled "Inverse Condemnation" in the Complaint). B. Ray Zoll appeared on
behalf of Plaintiff Intermountain Sports, Inc. ("Intermountain"), and argued the tort claims. John
Martinez also appeared on behalf of Intermountain and argued the remaining claims.
The Court, having reviewed the briefs submitted by the parties and the case law cited
therein, and having considered counsel's argument, and good cause appearing, hereby GRANTS
UDOT'S 12(c) MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, dismissing all of
Intermountain's claims against UDOT with prejudice.
The Court bases its decision on the facts alleged in Intermountain's complaint and facts
alleged in Intermountain's memoranda opposing UDOT's motion, as well as on the legal reasons
in UDOT's memoranda, which are discussed below.
RELEVENT FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
1. Intermountain is a recreational vehicle sales company located at 4225 South 500
West, Murray, Utah. (Compl. Iff 3, 8.)
2. UDOT is a State agency. (Complaint f 5.)
3. As part of its 145 Reconstruction Project (the "Project''), UDOT rebuilt the 4500
South interchange with 1-15. During construction beginning in July 1997, off-ramps and onramps to andfrom4500 South, and 4500 South itself, were periodically closed. (Complaint 1fH
10,19,21.)
4. Intermountain claims that as a result of the Project, its customers and vendors were
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denied reasonable access to its property, which substantially damaged its value. (Complaint U
••25.)..

-

5. Intermountain also claims that other businesses along the Project, located further
south, were not denied access to 4500 South and had a more direct access to 1-15 during
construction. (GompLf 39.).
6. Mermountain alleges that UDOT negligently planned and executed the traffic flow
around plaintiff s property during construction, which interfered with its contractual relationships
with customers and vendors. (Complaint U If 45,47.)
7. According to Intermountain, UDOT represented that its 1-15 access through 4500
South would be closed only one year, and that it would address Intermountain's concerns during
the Project. Intermountain claims that, based on these representations, it did not sue UDOT
during the Project. (Compl. ff 55-57.)
8. Intermountain has sued UDOT for inverse condemnation (Article I, Section 22 of the
Constitution); denial of uniform operation of laws (Article I, Section 24 of the Utah
Constitution); breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence,
and intentional interference with economic relations.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. In determining whether Mtermountain's Complaint must be dismissed under^R^
12(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court accepts the factual allegations in the
complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Arndt v.
First Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A., 1999 UT 91 f 2, 991 P.2d 584 (quoting Golding v. Ashley
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Cent Irr. Co., 793 P.2d 897, 898 (Utah 1990)). A motion for judgment on the pleadings should
be granted when if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not recover under the facts alleged. Id.
2. The Courtfindsthat under the 12(c) standard all of Intermountain's claims are barred
as a matter of law for the following reasons.
INTERMOUNTAIN'S TORT CLAIMS
3. Intermountain's tort claims are barred under the Governmental Immunity Act (the
"Immunity Act*').
4. To determine whether a governmental entity is immunefromsuit under the Immunity
Act, this Court must engage in a three-step analysis: (1) Is the activity at issue a governmental
function, for which the legislature has granted blanket immunity in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3?
(2) If so, then is blanket immunity waived in another section of the Immunity Act? (3) If blanket
immunity has been waived, is there an exception to that waiver which retains immunity? See,
e.g., Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete COM«0;, 2002 UT 17,1f 11,42 P.3d 379.
5. Intermountain does not dispute that blanket immunity applies under thefirststep
because it agrees that the activity at issue, reconstruction of 1-15, is a governmental function.
6. Underthe secondstep, immunity is waived for^^ Intermountain's negligence claim
under Section 63-30-10, which waives immunity "for injury proximately caused by a negligent
act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment." Utah Code Ann.
63-30-10 (1997 & Supp. 2001).
7. Under the third step, however, immunity is retained because under § 63-30-10
immunity for negligence is waived "except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or
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results from.. .interference with contract rights?' Id. § 63-30-10(2) (emphasis added).
8. Because Intermountain alleges in its complaint that UDOT's negligence interfered
with its contractual relationships with vendors and customers (compl. f 47), the negligence claim
is barred.
9. Even if, as intermountain argues, it sustained other injuries, such as diminution in the
value of its business, that injury would nonetheless "arise out of, in connection with or result
from" the interference with contractual relations. The exception under § 53-30-10(2) is broad
enough to cover the additionalinjuries Intermountain alleges.
10. Even if Intermountain could allege some injury that was entirely unrelated to
interference with its contractual relations, this Court concludes the negligence claim would still
fail under the economic loss doctrine, which bars negligence claims that seek to recover only
economic damages. See, e.g., SME Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, 2001 UT 34 ^ 32,28 P.3d 669.
11. The Court also concludes Intermountain's intentional interference with economic
relations claim is barred under the Immunity Act.
12. Applying the three-step analysis to the intentional interference claim, the Court
concludes that blanket immunity applies for the reason stated in paragraph 5, above. Under the
second step, blanket immunity is not waived, because the Immunity Act does not contain a
provision that waives immunity for intentional torts generally or interference with economic
relations specifically.
13. The Court rejects Intermountain's argument that other provisions of the Immunity
Act allow its negligence and intentional interference claims to proceed. According to
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Intermountain, these tort claims can be brought pursuant to § 63-30-8 and 63-30-10.5.
14. Intermountain's tort claims cannot proceed under § 63-30-8 because immunity under
that provision applies only to "a dangerous or defective condition of any highway." Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-8 (1997) (emphasis added). Intermountain has not alleged UDOT's acts resulted
in a dangerous or defective condition on a highway and thus § 63-30-8 does not apply. See also
Smithv. Weber Co. Sch.Disl,S77?2dl276,1279

(Utah Ct. App. 1994).

15. Intermountain also cannot bring its tort claims under § 63-30-10.5, which applies
when a governmental entity takes or damages private property for a public purpose. See Utah
Code Ann.§63-30-10.5 (1) (1997). Intermountain has alleged a claim for inverse condemnation
in its First Cause of Action, and § 63-30-10.5 does waive immunity for this claim. However, an
express waiver of immunity for a government taking simply cannot be construed to include a
waiver for negligence claims or intentional interference with economic relations claims.
INTERMOUNTAIN'S INVERSE CONDEMNATION CLAIM
16. Intermountain's inverse condemnation claim fails because the Utah Supreme Court
has previously held that temporary denial of access to property does not constitute a taking. See
e.g., Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459,465 (Utah 1989)
(denying inverse condemnation claim for city's interference with access to store because
temporary drainage system that interfered with access was not "permanent, continuous, or
inevitably recurring").
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17. This Court finds that LntermountamYallegati
temporarily denied Intermountain and its customers convenient access to thefreewayfails to
state an inverse condemnation claim under controlling Utah case law.
INTERMOUNTAIN'S UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS CLAIM
18. The Court also finds that Intermountain has not stated a claim sufficient to establish
that UDOT's activities during the Project amounted to a violation of the Utah Constitution's
Uniform Operation of Laws provision.
19. Intermountain has not identified any law that UDOT has not applied uniformly. Nor
has Intermountain alleged that UDOT discriminated against it because of its membership in an
identifiable class. Intermountain has therefore failed to state a claim under Article 1, Section 24
of the Utah Constitution.
BREACH OF CONTRACT
20. The Courtfindsthe factual allegations in Intermountain's complaint fail to state the
elements of a contract claim.
21. Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to establish the existence of a contract
Notably absent are the establishment of offer, acceptance, consideration, or any terms of the
agreement,
22. The Court rejects Intermountain's argument that it has stated a quasi contract claim
based on promissory estoppel. The facts Intermountain has alleged are insufficient to place this
case outside the general rule that promissory estoppel cannot be asserted against the government.
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BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
23. Intermountain's claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails
because Intermountain has failed to allege facts sufficient to show it had a contract with
Intermountain.

*

24. It is well settled that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be used to
establish new rights and duties not agreed to by the parties. See, e.g., Bethany v. Nordstrom, 812
P.2A 49 (Utah 1991).
„•• , , H .

: :.• '. : ORDER •• ."

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS UDOT's motions to dismiss
Intermountain's claims WITH PREJUDICE, the parties to bear their own costs.
DATED this

P

day of

U^xmJU^

, 2003.

BY THE COURT:

WILLIAM B.BOHL
Third District Court Ju
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I hereby certify that on the "2.U) day of November, 2003, a true, correct and complete
copy of the foregoing was delivered upon the following attorneys as indicated below:
Y\

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight
Facsimile
No Service

Jody K. Burnett
Robert C Keller
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P O Box 45678
Salt Lake City UT 84145-5678
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Hand Delivered
Overnight
Facsimile
No Service

John Martinez
2974 East St. Mary=s Circle
Murray, UT 84108
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Hand Delivered
Overnight
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No Service

Steven C. Tycksen
B.RayZoll
ZOLL & TYCKSEN, L.C.
5300 South 360 West, Suite 360
Murray, UT 84123
Def

Randy S. Hunter
160 East 300 South 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, SANDY DEPARTMENT

Intermountain Sports, Inc.
COMPLAINT
(JURY DEMAND)

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND
MURRAY CITY,

Honorable

Defendants.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Intermountain Sports, Inc.
("Intermountain"), by and through its' attorneys, Zoll & Tycksen, and
complains against the Defendants as follows:
JURISDICTION, VENUE AND PARTIES
1.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Venue of this claim is properly in this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-13-1, in that the cause of action arose in Salt
Lake County, and the property at issue is located in Salt Lake
County.
Plaintiff Intermountain is a business operating in Murray, Utah as
a recreational vehicle sales company.
Defendant Murray City (the "City") is a municipal corporation
organized pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah.
Defendant Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") is an
agency or instrumentality of the State of Utah.
Intermountain has a right to sue the defendants pursuant to
Article I, Sections 22 and 24 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code
Ann. §§ 63-30-10.5 and 63-30-10, and other legal and equitable
remedies.
The claims alleged in this complaint arise in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
John Ash by ("Ash by") is the owner and operator of
Intermountain located at 4225 South 500 West, Murray, Utah,
2
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on the west frontage road at 1-15 and north of 4500 South
Street ("the Affected Property").
Intermountain has had a longstanding easement of access on the
Affected Property/ giving it access to the 1-15 southbound offramp to 4500 South and to 4500 South Street. The Affected
Property is shown on the map attached hereto as Exhibit A and
incorporated herein by this reference.
On July 14, 1997, Intermountain received a letter and flyer from
Carol Provenzano with Wasatch Constructors giving open house
meeting information and the beginning date, on or about August
6, 1997, of the 1-15 Reconstruction Project. See Letter attached
as Exhibit B.
Upon information and belief, the open house meetings served
only for information and instruction, not for hearing and meeting
the needs of local businesses.
Prior to construction, Ashby performed extensive due diligence to
determine whether or not there would be little effect to his
business from the Reconstruction Project.
While serving as President of the 1-15 Coalition, a non-profit

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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group of business owners representing over 850 businesses
along the freeway corridor, Ashby testified at a meeting
addressing the Reconstruction Project at the request of Senator
'Howell. -

,;—./,
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Ashby, acting for Intermountain Sports RV and the 1-15
Coalition, contacted U D O T with respect to their plan for the 4500
South interchange. In response to his query, he was provided a
copy of a letter and drawing. These show a full closure of the
Affected Property at the 4500 South interchange for a period of
one year at the most.
U D O T represented to Intermountain that the Affected Property
would be closed for one year.
U D O T officials met with business owners, including Ashby, and
represented to said business owners that their concerns would
be taken into consideration, but ho action was taken nor
remuneration made for the anticipated taking of Intermountain's
property rights.
In direct reliance on the statements, representations and
drawings of the City and UDOT, Intermountain did not pursue

4
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action against UDOT or the City and has only now been able to
determine its ascertainable damages, making its claims ripe for
adjudication.
18.

After reconstruction of 1-15 began, traffic flow on 1-15, in the
area of 4500 South Street, dropped two thirds from the traffic
flow figures prior to the Reconstruction Project.

19.

In July 1997, UDOT began reconstruction on 1-15 effecting 4500
South Street, by closing the off-ramp to the Affected Property.
See Exhibit A.

20.

Access to the Affected Property was closed until December 1998,
a period of 18 months instead of the 12 months promised by
UDOT in its construction contract.

21.

The City and UDOT placed periodic closures on traffic at the 4500
South Street off-ramp over the following 2 xh years.

22.

The State and City were effectively closing access to freeway
exits and entrances, as well as access for East and West traffic at
the 4500 South Street off-ramp, from July 1997 until May 2001,
nearly a period of four years.

23.

The access provided by Defendants, in lieu of direct access off

5 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the 4500 South off-ramp, involved a circuitous 2.5-mile loop (the
"Circuitous Loop") (Attached as Exhibit WC") behind the Affected
Property, which frustrated and eliminated potential customers.
The Circuitous Loop was impractical and unreasonable for
purposes of bringing prospective customers from the freeway to
Plaintiff's business. Not only was the critical line of sight lost,
but also the route was lengthy and confusing.
24.

Upon information and belief, the already significantly diminished
number of potential customers from drive-by traffic, now 1/3 of
what it was prior to re-construction, ended up getting lost and
never arriving to Intermountain.

25.

The closure of the off-ramp, coupled with the change in
configuration, denied reasonable access to the Affected Property
and substantially damaged the value of Plaintiff's property in an
amount to be proven at trial but currently calculated to be in
excess of $2,000,000.00,

26.

The City constructed the Circuitous Loop in such a manner that
other businesses obtained direct access to 4500 South off-ramp
traffic, who otherwise benefited from the loss to Intermountain.

6
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27.

Such action by the Defendants became tantamount to a taking of
the property for the good of others and at the expense of
Intermountain without just compensation.

28.

In the alternative, the City and/or UDOT, their agents, and
employees who planned directed the traffic flow surrounding the
Affected Property failed to exercise reasonable care, which
directly resulted in the loss of business incurred by
Intermountain.

29.

Further, UDOT, its employees, and agents failed to exercise
reasonable care in the planning and execution of the
reconstruction of 1-15 and the 4500 South Street interchange,
which directly resulted in the loss of business incurred by
Intermountain.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(INVERSE CONDEMNATION - UDOT & MURRAY CITY)

30.

Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1 through 29 of the Complaint as if fully set forth
herein.
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In violation of § 63-30-10.5 of the Utah Code and Article I
•

•

-

•

•

<

Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, Defendants took or impaired
Plaintiff's substantial property right for a public use without just
M

compensation.
Upon information and belief, Defendants'determination to block
and/or take the Plaintiff's easement of access over the Affected

i

Property, allowing access to the 1-15 Southbound off-ramp at
4500 South and to 4500 South Street was based on a public
purpose to expand 1-15 to reduce traffic impediments and safety
concerns along 1-15, as well as enhancing the 4500 South offramp.
In closing the off-ramp and otherwise blocking and/or taking the
Plaintiff's easement of access, Defendants substantially and
materially impaired Plaintiff's right of access to the 1-15 off-ramp
at 4500 South and to 4500 South Street as well as Plaintiff's
customers' right of access to 4500 South Street and the Affected
Property.

8
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In blocking and/or taking the Plaintiff's easement of access over
the Affected Property, Defendants substantially diminished the
value of Plaintiff's private property.
This injury to Intermountain was an unavoidable result of the
City and UDOT's action and was continuous for a period of
almost four years.
Defendants' shutting down, blocking, and/or taking the Plaintiff's
easement of access to the 1-15 Southbound off-ramp at 4500
South and to 4500 South Street was damaging to Plaintiff's
private property interest for a public use without just
compensation.
Plaintiff is entitled to actual, economic, special and compensatory
damages to be proven at trial and believed to be at least
$2,000,000.00.
SECOND CAUSE Of* ACTION
(DENIAL OF UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS UDOT & MURRAY CITY)
Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1 through 37 of the Complaint as if fully set forth
herein.
9

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

6

The City and UDOT have discriminated against Plaintiff in
violation of Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution, by, among
other things, arbitrarily and capriciously providing other
businesses with direct and beneficial access to 4500 South Street
and by configuring such access so as to direct traffic flow to
those businesses, south of the Affected Property and north and
west of the Affected Property, while at the same time refusing to
offer such accommodations to Plaintiff who paid substantial taxes
to the City and State and who relied on the City and UDOT's
representations.
The City's and UDOT's accommodation of other businesses and
the diversion of traffic through State and Municipal regulations
from the Affected Property towards those other businesses was
unreasonable and was not for a legitimate legislative purpose.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH
AND FAIR DEALING - UDOT & MURRAY CITY)
Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations contained in
paragraphs i through 40 of the Complaint as if fully set forth
herein.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Defendant City and UDOT in determining to block and/or take
Plaintiff's substantial property interest in the Affected Property,
denying reasonable access to 1-15, and thereby stifling the
commercial development in the area effectively destroyed or
injured Intermountain's rights to receive its justified
expectations.
Plaintiff Intermountain has been seriously injured as a result of
the City and UDOT's conduct in an amount to be proven at trial
but currently calculated to be in excess of $2,000,000.00.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(NEGLIGENCE - UDOT & MURRAY CITY)
Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1 through 43 above as if fully set forth herein.
Plaintiff alleges that in the planning and execution of the traffic
flow surrounding the Affected Property the City and/or UDOT,
their employees, and agents failed to exercise reasonable care
when creating the circuitous route.
Plaintiff further alleges that UDOT, its employees, and agents
failed to exercise reasonable care in the planning, design, and

11
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execution of the reconstruction of 1-15 and the 4500 South
..interchange..
47.

Upon information and belief, the Defendants negligently
interfered with the contractual relationships and potential
relationships Intermountain had with vendors and customers, by
(1) causing vendors to discontinue doing business with
Intermountain, (2) making it impossible for Intermountain to
satisfy customers, and (3) jeopardizing the value of
Intermountain's business.

48.

The Defendants have negligently and proximately, caused
damages to Intermountain. Intermountain is entitled to
damages in an amount to be proven at trial for the Defendants'
Interference.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS UDOT AND MURRAY CITY)
49.

Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1 through 48 above as if fully set forth herein.

50.

Upon information and belief, the Defendants intentionally
interfered with the economic relationship Intermountain had with
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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its potential buyers, the buyers choosing to not come by the
property and to not do any further business with Intermountain.
Upon information and belief, the Defendants' interference was
for an improper purpose, which was to have intermountain's
customers and vendors avoid the property voluntarily and
discontinue or avoid any business relationship with
Intermountain.
Upon information and belief/the Defendants' interference was by
an improper means, as Defendants, contrary to law, requested
that Intermountain and other businesses not bring claims against
them and did not conduct condemnation hearings.
The Defendants' interference was the proximate and immediate
cause of Intermountain's economic injuries. Intermountain is
entitled to damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(BREACH OF CONTRACT - UDOT)
Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1 through 53 above as if fully set forth herein.
Defendant UDOT made representations to Intermountain that

13

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

6

the closed access to 1-15 at 4500 South would last one year.
UDOT made representations to Intermountain that it would
address the concerns of the local businesses along 1-15,
Including those of Intermountain.
Intermountain relied upon those representations and did not
bring an action during the reconstruction of 1-15.
Such forbearance, based on UDOT's representations and
promises to address the needs of business owners, constituted
consideration for that promise.
Defendant UDOT breached this contract by never addressing the
business' concerns, including those of Intermountain.
UDOT further breached this contract by closing access to 1-15 at
4500 South for a period of nearly four years, and not one year
as represented to Intermountain by Defendant UDOT.
Plaintiff Intermountain has been seriously injured as a result of
the Defendant's conduct in an amount to be proven at trial but
currently calculated to be in excess of $2,000,000.00.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
NOW THEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against the
Defendants as follows:
li

On its First Cause of Action, Intermountain requests that this
Court award it damages in an amount to be proven at trial but
calculated to be at least $2,000,000.00.

2.

On its Second Cause of Action, Intermountain requests that this
Court award it damages in an amount to be proven at trial but
currently calculated to be in excess of $2,000,000.00.

3.

On its Third Cause of Action, Intermountain requests that this
Court award it damages in an amount to be proven at trial but
currently calculated to be in excess of $2,000,000.00.

4.

On its Fourth Cause of Action, Intermountain requests that this
Court award it damages for the City and State's negligent
interference with the contractual relationships Intermountain had
and still has with its vendors as well the lost potential
relationships with future customers and vendors in an amount to
be proven at trial and calculated at $2,000,000.00.

15
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5.

On its Fifth Cause of Action, Intermountain requests that this
Court award it: damages for the Defendants' negligent and
intentional interference with the prospective economic
relationships Plaintiff had and still has with its buyers, in an
amount to be proven at trial and calculated at $2,000,000.00.

6.

On its Sixth Cause of Action, Intermountain requests that this
Court award it damages in an amount to be proven at trial but
currently calculated to be in excess of $2,000,000.00.

7.

For costs and attorney fees as allowed by law.

8.

For such other and further legal and equitable relief as the court
may find just and proper.

DATED and SIGNED this ^ " day of May 2002.
ZOLL & TYCKSEN, L.C.

B. RayZol'l/
•
~^~
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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EXHIBIT A
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INTERSTATE 15

July 14, 1997

RECONSTRUCTION

Dear Resident or Business Owner

.

*

On or around August 6, the I-15 Reconstruction Project will begin to affect residents, commuters and
businesses using the 4500 South interchange. This action is one of many that make up the largest designbuild highway project in the United States.
For you, it means planning your trips to address closure of I-I5 Southbound off-ramp at 4500 South and
the 4500 South on-ramp to I-I5 Southbound. Bgft^o§i^j^ % w^

.

Access to 4500 Southfrom1-15 Southbound
* Exit at 3300 South and take State Street or Redwood Road
* Exit at 5300 South and take State Street or Redwood Road
*.**
«
•

»

•

•

•

•

•

•

Access to Points Southfromt4500 South
* Take State Street to 5300 South on-ramp to 1-15 Southbound
•Take 4500South to 1-215
An alternate for all North/South travel is 1-215. This roadway has been expanded to four lanes in each
direction. The additional capacity and easy access to east/west surface streets makes this a good alternate
to include in your trip planning. During 4500 South ramp closures, southbound ramps will remain open at
3300 South and 5300 South. Ramps at 4500 South will re-open in approximately 12 months.
Drivers can expect quicker and easier access; to andfromI-15 when reconstruction is complete. Until
construction is complete, staying informed is your key to getting through the 1-15 reconstruction with as
little impact as possible to your schedule and your lifestyle. Call the information line at 888-1NFO-I15.
Access die Web site at www.I-15.com. Find and use traffic reports in the local media. Consider changing
your travel patterns by combining trips or talking with your employer about flex-time scheduling. Think
aboutridinga bike, taking the bus to work or eliminating some trips altogether by telecommuting -you'll
be reducing traffic (and your stress level!).
.
Included with this letter, is a flyer addressing issues specific to the 4500 South areas. Flyer information
includes an announcement for business and community open house meetings. These meetings are an
opportunity to obtain more information on planned closures, alternate routes, and project process and [
schedule - we hope you will come.
Thank you in advance for your active participation.

*

AM^^
Carol Provenzano
/I
~:
^
Business and Community Affii/s
Program Manager
Wasatch Constructors
* Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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4500 South Interchange Ramp Closw
The rcconsoxicaon of 4500 South interchange
means quicker, easier access to and from 1-15.
In addition to rebuilding bridge footings, the
bridges themselves and expanding the decks,
this intersection will be rebuilt with an'
improved interchange. The new Single Point
Urban Interchange (SPUD system will make
**' traffic flow more effective and efficient.

SEEING IS BELIEVING
Reconstruction activities will bring with them
barriers blocking closed ramps, detour signs
and some increased truck traffic Working
with construction impacts may be difficult at
-•first,but driver planning and regular use of
alternate mutes will make your trips easier:

CLOSURE SCHEDULE
August 6:

M5 Southbound off-ramp to 4500 South.
August 6;
4500 South on-ramp to1-15 Southbound.
East to west travel on 4500 South will remain
open during ramp closures. Infrequent
closures may be necessary during bridge
removal activities - the community; affected
business and services will be notified. The
northbound on-and off-ramps will remain
open dunng this approximately one-year
closure.

Access to Points Southfrom4500 South
• Take State Street to 5300 South on-ramp
•lake 4500 South to i-215
An alternate for all North/South travel is !•
,215. This roadway has been expanded to four
lanes in each direction. The additional
capacity and easy access to ease/west surface
streets makes this a good alternate to include
in your trip planning. During 4500 South
ramp closures, southbound-off ramps wiH
remain open at 3300 Soudi and 5300 South.
OPEN HOUSE MEETINGS
Wasatch Constructors will host a series of
Open House meetings focusing on upcoming '
ramp closures at 3300 and 4500 South. The
meetings will give residents and businesses a
chance to:
• Learn about planned closures
• View plans for the reconstructed
interchange
• Discuss communications plans
• Review alternate route options
continued on back..

Off-r&mp
closed on
approxfmatTy
August 6th

ALTERNATE ROUTES
^
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I--15 Reconstruction i urn
480 North 2200 West
Salt Lake City. UT 84116

—.** «*

Information: Where to get it
OPEN HOUSE MEETINGS:
Business Open H o u s e s
Monday, July 28
12:00 -1:30 p.m.
Quality Inn
4465 Cencury Dc (450 W)
Murray
Wednesday, July 30
12:00-1:30 p.m.
Quality Inn
4465 Century Dc (450 W)
Murray
Community Open H o u s e s
Tuesday July 29
6 p.m. - 8 p.m.
Woodrow Wilson Elementary
2825 South 200 Ease
South Salt Lake

"PLAN ON IT" - STAY INFORMED
Until construction is complete, staying
informed is your key GO getting through the
1-15 reconstruction with as little impact as
possible to your schedule and your lifestyle.
Read the newspaper and watch/listen'for traffic
updates on radio and TV news. Tfou can access
information sources at:
Internet: www.I-15.com
Tollfree: 1-888-INFO-I-15
UDOT: 964-6000 (recorded information)
QUESTIONS? U&satch Constructors
UDOTHSTeam
Cpnstmction Noise

594-6400
281-8167
322-2378

For UDOT issues not directly relaced to the
I-l5 Reconstruction Project, zeeaiss UDOTY
Web site at www.sr.ex.state.ut.us and select the
Road Conditions icon, or

call UDOT ac
Thursday, July 31
965-4000.
6 p.m.-8 p.m.
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4500 South Alternafe Routes

Closed Ramps:
1
4500 South southbound off-ramp
4500 South- northbound on and off-ramps
3300 South southbound on-ramp

East/West Closure:

• 4500 South between 500 West and 100 West
(4500 South eastbound to 1-15 southbound remains open)

Alternate East/West Routes:

ipen Ramps:
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BILL OF RIGHTS.

had no such l a w before. We have had
nothing declaring this inequality, b u t
they have been equal just the same.
But there m a y a contingency arise in
this country when this power, or rather
this limitation upon the power of the
state government, will be exceedingly
dangerous. I think t h a t it ought t o be
wiped o u t and left entirely t o t h e Legislature. . F o r t h a t reason I am in favor of
the motion t o strike out.
Mr. WELLS. Mr. Chairman, I desire
t o state—the gentleman has said t h a t
this is the same proposition t h a t is in
the s t a t e of Wyoming. I will say t h a t
it is also in North Dakota, Arkansas,
Nebraska, South Dakota, Wisconsin—
as m a n y as t h a t and I d o n ' t know how
many others.
Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. Chairman, I
would be in favor of the motion for
this reason, t h a t there m a y come a
time when the safety and defense of our
government might require t h a t there
should be a distinction between aliens
and citizens, in regard t o holding property, and I think t h a t it can be safely
left t o the Legislature.
. The CHAIRMAN.
Gentlemen, the
motion of Mr. Varian, of Salt Lake, was
t o strike out section 21. Mr. Wells
moves t o amend b y . striking out the
word "resident" in line 2.
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, I
raise a point of order on t h a t ; t h a t is
not germane.
The CHAIRMAN. If the point of
order is raised, I shall have t o sustain
it.
The question w a s t a k e n on t h e motion
of Mr. Varian, and on division there
were: ayes, 49, noes, 43.
Section 21 w a s stricken out.
Section 22 w a s read as follows:

March 25f

t h a t the word "whereof' be s t r i d e
o u t and the words, ".of which'' be sul
stituted.
Mr. EICHNOR. I think t h a t is tlif
language of the Constitution of tt|j
United States.
Mr. WELLS. Exactly.
Mr. EICHNOR. I believe in adhering
t o t h e Constitution of the United Stat
when we copy it.
Mr. WHITNEY. I t is a hundre
years old.
The question being taken on t&l
motion of Mr. Whitney, the amenili
ment was rejected.
M
Section 23 was read as follows:
Section 23. Private property shal
n o t be taken or damaged for public u s |
w i t h o u t just compensation.

Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman,
move an amendment by adding tU
w o r d s "first m a d e / ' so t h a t his co
pensation shall be made before tliepropl
erty is taken. T h a t is in accord witS
m o s t of the constitutions.
Mr. ROBERTS. Does t h a t mean h |
fore the damage is done?
Mr. THURMAN. No; I move to stritg
o u t the words "or damaged.''
Mr. VARIAN. Mr. Chairman, I c s |
for a division of that—there are t ^
motions.
d§|
The CHAIRMAN. The chair will;
vide the motion so t h a t the question.$|§
striking out "or damaged" will ftrstvfl
voted upon. .
Mr. THURMAN.
Mr. C h a i r m a n ^
would like to suggest to the gentlemSl
* from Salt Lake, Mr. Varian, t h a t irtp
purpose in offering this .amen&nenfc#§|
t o provide for a compensation beiiigj
m a d e before the property is taken,
t h e words "or d a m a g e d " are put^fi
there t h a t cannot be very well det§f|
mined. There ought t o be a separal
Section 22. Neither slavery n o r invol- section covering the d a m a g e of t i l
u n t a r y servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the p a r t y shall property.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to strike out "or d a m a g e d " is a very knowledge of men and can be adduced
material matter. I have t a k e n pains before a jury. I do n o t care how the?
t o look a t it a little to-day in the late gentleman does it. I do n o t wish t o be
works on eminent domain, and I find technical a b o u t it; I would like t o see
it is put in other constitutions or stat- those words, "or d a m a g e d , " kept in
utes t o meet the entire case. In some some way.
states some courts have held t h a t damI hope those words, " o r diamaged,"
age t o property of a consequential kind will remain in t h a t section. I do n o t
was n o t necessarily within t h e meaning wish t o argue the point, b u t I can see
of the article of the constitution.
F o r in a great many instances where it
instance, I believe in Pennsylvania—I would be very i m p o r t a n t . F o r instance,
may have confounded the state—the on a sidewalk, a person owning land;
question arose where an elevated road they dig down a b a n k t e n o r fifteen feet,
was erected upon a street and while it and damage t h a t lot t o a g r e a t extent.
did n o t touch the property of the abut- I think the man should be remunerated
ting owner, did n o t destroy a brick, did for the damage done t o his lot. I move
not take a foot of his ground, it did af- t h a t those words remain in t h a t section
fect his use and occupation of his prem- if they possibly can remain there.
ises very disastrously.. I t affected the
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, my
convenience of the i n h a b i t a n t s of a objectiou t o the words " o r damaged"
house, and in this particular case, fol- is the utter impracticability of prolowing later, it was held t h a t there w a s viding for compensation before the
no remedy. There w a s n o t the t a k i n g d a m a g e is done. Now, I will cite a n
of the property. Now, the courts of instance familar t o a g r e a t many. A
New York went off in another direction few years ago people in Salt Lake
County placed some b o a r d s in a dam
; and it is finally settled in t h a t case t h a t
such injury as t h a t could be compen- here a t the point of t h e mountain:
sated under the law of eminent domain. they had a right t o do t h a t if they did
| To make it perfectly clear this w o r d has n o t damage anybody and I d o n ' t supbeen put in laws and constitutions, and pose they t h o u g h t they would damage
^ the text-writers say t h a t it is an equiv- anybody, a t the sam.e time they did it:
%: alent for any kind of injury of t h a t .but the result w^as t h a t a g r e a t many
rkind.
people in Utah County were damaged,
Mr. THURMAN.
Mr. Chairman, I after the act which caused the damage.
I agree t h a t the compensation ought to Now, in a case of t h a t kind h o w would
%:.to be made, but the trouble would be to compensation be made before the act
%;make it first in the case of a consequen- w a s done which caused the damage?
t i a l damage.
Damage is n o t always—in fact is n o t
t Mr. FARR. I do n o t see w h y . Take often contemplated or expected. I t
::-'a case like t h a t . I t could be estimated. comes unlooked for as the consequence
Jt.There could be no subsequent change; of an act which the p a r t y performs.
1-there is the railroad; there is the house; Consequently it seems t o me t h a t as t o
there are the windows; there is the t a k i n g property by the l a w of eminent
| deprivation of light and air; there are domain they should have the right t o
all the necessary inconveniences of noise t a k e it when they pay for it, if the neJ^and soot and cinders, and disturbing cessity for t a k i n g it exists. As regards
g? the peace and rest of the family.
T h a t damaging it, why, it o u g h t t o be paid
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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understand the gentleman correctly, read a line or t w o from Lewis in hisll
from Utah County, he would be in work upon Eminent Domain:
i a v o r of striking out the words, -"or
"When the people of Illinois revisedl
d a m a g e d . " Gentlemen, I hope this their constitution in 1870, they intro-f
a m e n d m e n t will prevail. J u s t for the ducecl an i m p o r t a n t change into the!
very reason t h a t the gentleman from provision respecting the power of erni-)
nent domain. The provision reads as'?
Weber County said i t should be in the follows: 'Private property shall not be"
Constitution. Take a city like Salt taken or damaged for public use without)
compensation.' Every other state?
Lake, where grading is required, or any just
which has revised its constitution since I
other city where grading is required, 1870, except North Carolina, which^
and you will b a n k r u p t those cities if never had any provision on the subject,;
has followed the example set by Illinois
you place this in the Constitution. by adding the word 'damaged' or its;
r
Every man t h a t owns property in the equivalent t o the provision in question.' j.
street—the street will be graded and
And the question not only refers to
one or t w o or three people will claim
d a m a g e s and the result will be it will street grades in cities, but refers t o
grades of railway property. For inbring the municipalities into court.
Mr. VARIAN. Would n o t the com- stance, it is unfair t h a t a railroad should
pensation benefit always allowed in a run right next t o a man's front door or
case of t h a t kind more t h a n equalize almost next t o his front door, and t h a t
his property should be destroyed or
the damage?
half the value taken a w a y without
Mr. EICHNOR. The l a w is unsettled
making some compensation for t h a t
a t present in regard t o the grading of
property which is really not reached,
streets whether they can secure damas no p a r t of the property is taken;
ages; it would simply b a n k r u p t Salt
t h a t is, the p a r t of the property t h a t is
L a k e City, I tell you t h a t , gentledamaged; and I say I am in favor of
men, if y^u place this in the Constibeing liberal in eminent domain act, but.
tution.
whenever we g r a n t this liberty to corMr. PIERCE. Mr. Chairman, I am
porations in any way—public or private
in favor of retaining the words "or
corporations, we should make thempay^
d a m a g e d . " I recollect a spectacle a few
for whatever they take, and I believe
years ago of .grading, in Salt Lake City.
the words "or d a m a g e d " should remain
There w a s a certain street—I believe it
in the Constitution.
w a s S t a t e street—the grade had been
Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I a m |
established for some years, and the city
came in and established a different grade opposed t o the motion t o strike out the;
a n d built the street up some ten feet words "or damaged." I believe, as has;
higher t h a n property a b u t t i n g on it. been said already in this discussion,^
There is a spectacle where they could t h a t when the public use a man's propn o t get any damages for it, and the erty or make an improvement t h a t vhv
street as it w a s built absolutely de- •tually destroys the use of t h a t property,;
stroyed the value of their property and t h a t they should pay for it as much as'
t h e y could not get a cent for t h a t . I if the property itself were taken. Of;
say t h a t it o u g h t t o be fixed so t h a t course, as has been suggested by the ;
t h e city must adjust the grade for the gentleman from Salt Lake, whatever
accommodation of people t h a t own benefit results by reason of this improperty along a certain street and provement is set off against the damage
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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raising of a grade or by the lowering of erty h a s been taken and t h e p a r t y disa grade or by a n y other kind of im- possessed and t h a t the property be litiprovement t o injure private property gated for for considerable length of time
and because they d o n ' t actually enter and the p a r t y kept out of possession,
upon and t a k e the property itself, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g there m a y be a bond
although they do destroy the use of there, and a t the same time probably he
the property, t h a t they should be liable would h a v e t o sue upon t h e bond
for damage; I think it is unjust and afterwards. I think it is a very strong
unfair and I a m therefore opposed t o proposition a n y w a y t o give the public
this motion.
a right t o dispossess a private person of
Mr. RALEIGH. Mr. Chairman, I pro- his property summarily and i t seems t o
pose a slight amendment, " P r i v a t e me he o u g h t t o be compensated before
property shall n o t be taken for public t h a t is done, because he m a y be p u t t o
use or damage w i t h o u t just compensa- a g r e a t inconvenience and loss of time.
tion first be m a d e . " Simply a recon- He m a y have t o sue even upon the bond
struction of t h e section, t h a t is all.'
after he should vindicate his rights in
The CHAIRMAN.
The chair rules t h e court. Therefore, I a m in favor
t h a t t h a t would be a proper question t h a t if t h a t should be requh-ed, he
on revision and compilati on.
should be first compensated before his
Mr. THUBMAN.
Mr. Chairman, I p r o p e r t y is taken.
will w i t h d r a w the motion to amend as
Mr. GOODWIN. Mr. Chairman, I do
far as " o r d a m a g e d " is concerned if it is n o t believe the committee can pass
not objected t o .
such a n amendment. Emergencies may
Mr. PIERCE. Mr. Chairman, I d o n ' t arise when i t would be simply imposthink t h a t 'first m a d e " should be put sible t o carry it out.
W h a t there
in there. If I recollect the s t a t u t e cor- o u g h t t o be is a law (and t h a t belongs
rectly now, whenever a corporation is t o the Legislature) t o compel fair treatpermitted t o enjoy the benefits of the ment b o t h w a y s . I t is true t h a t raileminent domain act and desires t o take road companies have had the r i g h t .of
property a t all, before they can do it w a y , and they o w n and have owned
they have t o apply t o the court* and it for t h i r t y years where they have gone
is within the discretion of the court to t h r o u g h . I t is-lust\-a»-t^ueijltat^if-- you
fix a bond and require good sureties t r y t o build a railroad t h r o u g h some
before t h a t property is taken, and I back street in Provo, or up t o some
believe it should be left t o the Legisla- mining camp, you would find yourture as t o how it shall be taken. This self confronted w i t h the m o s t ridiculous
is simply a declaration of principles p r o p e r t y values you ever heard of, and
t h a t it shall n o t be taken. The Legis- every m a n in t h a t t o w n t h a t you would
lature can require any corporation get as a n appraiser would raise the
either private or public, t o put up a price. I t is all right as it is; let the
bond before they t a k e anybody's pr< >p- Legislature fix it sometime within a
erty or damage it, w i t h o u t any consti- year t h a t the property shall be paid for
tutional provision.
and t h a t the p a r t y taking the property
shall
give ample bonds. I n this bill of
Mr. CREER. Mr. Chairman, I a m in
favor of the motion of the gentleman rights it is simply foolish t o p u t somefrom Utah, t h a t t h e amendment shaJl thing t h a t c a n n o t be executed, because
be added t o the section for the reason emergencies would arise in the mines,
inJ. the
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it exactly, and I say t h a t if I d o n ' t u p before this Convention t h a t will be
a d o p t this method—if you adopt the. of greater importance t o i t t h a n the one
other method, then you p u t a block in t h a t is being discussed right now. I a m
the w a y of progress and of develop- heartily in accord, Mr. Chairman, w i t h
ment in this country, and in this new t h e remarks of the gentleman who h a s
State, t h a t the people of the State do just been on the floor, Mr. Richards; I
n o t w a n t to have there; t h a t is w h a t I d o n ' t believe we can afford in this Consay. I instanced it in t h e very example vention t o take t h a t m a t t e r out of t h e
I am in
I have stated. I can point t o cases n o w h a n d s of the Legislature.
t h a t are pending in the district court favor of the Legislature meeting and
in this district t h a t have been pending a r r a n g i n g h o w this shall be done. I s a y
there over a year—just such cases as I t h a t we can afford t o be as liberal a s
am speaking of where companies have t h e great s t a t e of Illinois. There is a
entered upon the property of people, s t a t e t h a t is almost one solid garden.
who refused t o enter into negotiations I t is said t h a t there is n o t one point in
with them or t o agree w.ith them on a the s t a t e of Illinois t h a t is ten miles
fair compensation for t h a t property; from a railroad. Now, w h a t do they
they entered upon it and gave their do? They leave it t o t h e Legislature,
bonds, and from t h a t d a y t o this the and as it has been read on this floor
court has not reached t h a t case and already during this debate, they simply
they haven't been able t o litigate it. s a y t h a t damages and compensation
Now, would you say t h a t railroad shall be allowed by a jury or fixed by
should not have been constructed—that t i e state. They leave it t o the Legist h a t public improvement, whatever it l a t u r e . Now, why c a n n o t we be a s
might be, ought n o t t o be made. Why, liberal as they are? Mi\ Chairman, I
if you say t h a t , you will n o t have rail- can tell you why we cannot be more
roads, and many other public improve- liberal t h a n they are, for the very reason
ments will not be made, for the reason, t h a t the lands t h a t our railroads are
as I have stated, t h a t when men enter built over into this g r e a t vast desert
into these undertakings t h a t involve country are far less valuable t h a n they
the expenditure of large a m o u n t s of cap- are in the s t a t e of Illinois.
ital, they do it because t h e time is ripe
This is a country of the most difficult
when they enter iipbii t h e . enterprise kind t o build railroads and maintain
for the accomplishment of it, and if they them in. We have long hauls, and t h e
cannot accomplish i t within a reason- m o s t heavy grades t h a t are t o be
able time, if they have g o t t o w a i t t w o found anywhere in the world, and in
or three years before they can commence order t o build railroads we must give
the construction of the road, they are them an opportunity and a fair show.
n o t goijig t o build a railroad, they are Now, the gentlemen t h a t are familiar
n o t going t o project it.
F o r t h a t w i t h the construction of railroads
reason, I say I a m opposed t o it and I t h r o u g h these canyons and these mounsay t h a t the individual h a s ample pro- t a i n s all know w h a t t h e builder of a
tection, when the owner of the property railroad has t o contend with. I have
and the company t h a t desires t o t a k e seen it myself, within twenty-five miles
it cannot agree upon its value and upon of this town. I have seen a railroad
the damage t h a t will be incurred, and a blockaded for three months and o u r
sufficient bond is p u t up, as soon as the men behind their breastworks t o prem a t t e r is determined he gets his money. vent t h a t railroad from passing over a
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even if they say they shall have just the other side, t h a t if we w a n t this
compensation, w i t h o u t some manner Constitution voted for we must protect
t o he indicated h o w t h a t compensation t h e rights of the masses, even if it does
shall he arrived a t , I think t h a t t h e n o t suit the righteous corporations.
rights of the individual will he infringed
Mr. MURDOCK (Wasatch). Inasmuch
upon as the experience of the p a s t h a s as this discussion h a s g o t down t o the
shown t h a t they have been infringed laymen, I feel t h a t I ought t o say a
u p o n . I am in favor of the amendment w o r d or t w o , inasmuch as I disagree
of t h e substitute. 1 should have liked w i t h the gentlemen t h a t have spoken
t o have seen it d r a w n a little farther upon the question.
As it has been
a n d provide how t h e farmer whose s t a t e d by our legal men, the l a w s of
r i g h t is taken from him should he com- U t a h make provisions for damage t o
pensated. I find t h a t in California, parties who are injured by railroads
Colorado and other states, t h a t in a n d by other corporations passing over
their constitutions they have provided their lands. I think w e can safely t r u s t
t h a t the amount shall be paid into this t o the Legislature t o protect the
c o u r t for the owner before the right of m a n , t o protect private individuals
w a y shall be appropriated. They have from corporations trespassing upon
also provided, in some states, for a jury them, b u t I think t h a t if this substitute
or a number of commissioners t o decide of the amendment prevails it will place
w h a t t h e damage or t h e compens.ation a n obstruction in t h e w a y n o t only of
shall be before ever t h e right of w a y railroads, but of enterprises like irrigaaccrues. I think t h a t t h a t is just. I t tion companies. I n my short experience,
is humane, and I d o n ' t think any l a w h a d this law been the law w i t h o u t any
o u g h t t o compel the farmer or the citi- other legislation, it certainly would
zen t o litigate for his n a t u r a l , inalien- have stopped several irrigation comable and indefeasible rights, and I think panies from building their canals for
a r i g h t of property is just as useful, just three or four years, long enough t o
a s good, and just as near t o the indi- h a v e prohibited the owners of the land
vidual in many cases as life itself, for from raising enough grain t o have paid
life is dependent upon those rights of t h e expenses of building those canals.
property. I am in favor of the amend- Now, I am opposed t o the substitute
m e n t or the substitute; I d o n ' t care and t o the amendment, and I t r u s t
which prevails, as I believe either will t h a t this committee will vote them
arrive a t the point t h a t w e wish t o see down, and t h a t we will leave it in the
obtained.
h a n d s of the Legislature of this future
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I S t a t e t o make such l a w s t h a t shall he
a m surprised a t m a n y gentlemen here necesssary for t h e protection of propin their remarks t h a t they have made. erty owners.
We m u s t have a very wicked p e o p l e Calls for the question.
people t h a t own little pieces of land
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, 1
where the railway
companies go d o n ' t know whether this committee
through—and very holy, just, and desires t o hear me or not. I made this
righteous railway corporations.
I t niotion and have n o t had a single
m u s t be all in favor of t h e corporation chance t o speak t o it. I made i t in
a n d nothing in favor of the people. good faith, I believe t h a t t h e r i g h t of
Now, I believe people have rights, and property is a sacred right, and no m a t w e are here t o protect t h e rights of the t e r if i t is the w i d o w ' s mite, I believe
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graze on a thousand hills; having a their work, t h a n t o have the poor m a n
sacred and absolute right t o his prop- kept w i t h o u t the use of his property
erty, having paid for i t and the com- and sitting by and seeing another m a n
p a n y owner; it m a y be his home—it reveling in the possession of it, while he
may be all he h a s and the proposition has not anything in return for it? N o w ,
here now advanced is t h a t a railroad Mr. Chairman, I am about as much
company m a y come along and stake surprised as my colleague from U t a h
out this lot and tell hirn t o get off and County t o hear men talking just as if
a w a i t the slow process of the law in this provision of the l a w which stands
litigation; and we know w h a t it is to-day in two-thirds of the modern
when you come t o litigation with t h e constitutions in the United States w a s
railroad company; they just simply an innovation here. As if the progress
have the a d v a n t a g e a t every turn. of the whole country w a s going t o be
They have their a t t o r n e y s paid by the stopped, because we w a n t t o get into
year; they have money t o bring for- the Constitution a provision which
w a r d all the witnesses they want, and says t h a t before a person using the
t o secure every a d v a n t a g e ' t h a t the l a w power of the S t a t e can take from a
possibly gives. And if delay is of any m a n the property t h a t belongs t o him
benefit t o them in t h a t case they insist he must first p a y for it. I say there
on the delay and they get it. In the are two-thirds of them. I will n o t
meantime, the m a n is deprived of his take the time t o read the clauses in the
property, his home is taken away from various constitutions, but nearly all
him, and because his home is only a the modern constitutions provide t h a t
m a t t e r of three or four hundred dol- this payment must be made in advance;
lars—it did n o t a m o u n t t o much any- and I believe the constitution in the
w a y as the gentleman from Salt Lake s t a t e of Washington has been referred
in front of me here intimated, very t o more t h a n any constitution in the
much in the language of a corpora- United States—has been referred t o
tion attorney-—it w ^ s n o t worth any- more by members on this floor t h a n
thing anyway—land t h a t was n o t any other constitution, and I am going
w o r t h a cent.
Now, the facts are, t o read t h a t p a r a g r a p h as it will only
;.''••.
gentlemen, t h a t this proposition will t a k e a moment:
n o t retard the development of the
Private property shall not be t a k e n
country.
I t will n o t .retard the for public use, except for private w a y s
progress of the country, but as sug- of necessity, and for drains, flumes, or
ditches, on or across the lands of others
gested by one of the gentlemen on this for agricultural, domestic, or s a n i t a r y
floor if railroad companies understood purposes. No private property shall
be taken or damaged for public or
t h a t they must determine this compen- private use w i t h o u t just compensation
s a t i o n in advance, they will see t o it having been first made or paid into
t h a t instead of ceaseless and endless court for t h e owner, and no right of
w a y shall be appropriated t o the use of
litigation, they will be anxious t o bring any corporation other t h a n municipal,
their cases t o the front, if it comes t o a until full compensation therefor be first
case, and have them disposed of, and if made in money or ascertained and paid
paid into c o u r t for the owner.
a man does ask them w h a t they m a y
think is a little bit extraordinary in
Now, I ask w h a t could be more just
its terms, had n o t they better, in view t h a n t h a t ? T h a t is all t h a t is deof the fact t h a t they had this extraor- manded in this, and gentlemen, it does
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manipulations and negotiations for private use. I understand he is pre^jx order t o secure the money for the en- paring a n a r g u m e n t on it.
terprise, b u t if men w h o desire t o enMr. SQUIRES. He might w a n t t o
i in business enterprises see this pro- strike o u t one and amend the other.
vision in our Constitution and see t h a t
Mr. EVANS (Weber).
No; he talked
Jjfrey can n o t go upon an individual's t o me a b o u t it.
jfand w i t h o u t first paying for it, w o u l d
The proposed amendment of Mr.
|aot it have a tendency t o retard t h i s E v a n s w a s read.
progress which we all so much desire? I
Mr. PIERCE. Are you going t o p u t
t h a t the corporation ought t o se- in the words, " o r damaged?"
fare the individual for the value of his
Mr. EVANS (Weber). I am willing t o
land, but I say the Legislature has al- as far as I a m concerned.
ready done t h a t and i t always will do
Mr. PIERCE. Well, I am in favor of
3t, and if in the good judgment of t h e the motion with those words in.
people who compose the next LegislaMr. ELDREDGE.
With the consent
ture, they deem it necessary and proper of the gentleman I would suggest it read
bo require payment first t o be made, let as follows: " P r i v a t e property shall n o t
lem do it, b u t let us n o t put a rigid,
be taken or damaged for public or prinyielding thing of this kind in o u r • vateiise w i t h o u t just compensation,"
i n s t i t u t i o n , which is so h a r d t o and leave all the balance t o t h e Legislalimend. Leave it as it has been left ture.
other states.
Leave it as it is left
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Section 23 p r o the Constitution of the United vides t h a t it shall n o t be t a k e n o r
States. T h a t is a good model w i t h re- damaged.
j e c t t o a m a t t e r of this kind, and I do
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). Mr. Presibelieve t h a t any injury would result
dent,
I offer this as a substitute for
n it.
|Mr. SQUIRES. Mr. President, I would section 22:
to ask t h a t this section and the folP r i v a t e p r o p e r t y shall n o t be t a k e n
w7- •
Mwing section, 23, pass over w i t h o u t for public use, or damaged, w i t h o u t
compensation as determined by a
Jtction for the present, and for this rea- just
jury, which shall be paid as soon a s i t
Mr. Varian informed me on yester- can be ascertained and before possesTday t h a t he had been making a care- sion is taken. No benefit which m a y
accrue t o the owner as a result of an
iiexamination of this subject a n d he improvement m a d e by any private corporation shall be considered in fixing^Satisfied t h a t the action already t a k e n
compensation for property t a k e n o r
fi section 23 is in violation of the l a w the
damaged.
[eminent domain.
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. President, if
|The PRESIDENT. No question a b o u t
any of these proposed amendments
jMr. SQUIRES.
And the proposition prevail, I hope it will be the last oneJ§hich he has, I presume would be t o proposed. There is something in t h a t
%ike out one of these sections a n d t h a t has the true ring. I cannot s a y
•|ve the t w o sections consolidated, t h a t I a m exactly in full s y m p a t h y
for t h a t reason and in his absence, w i t h it t o the extent t o which it goes,
||vrould like t o have the Convention but, gentlemen, this is a serious question
'§ss over these t w o sections, or further we are dealing w i t h . There is nothing:
Consideration of them, for the present. more sacred t h a n the right of property r
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over the s t r a w again t h a t w a s threshed here we propose t o give a railroad cof.3
in committee of the whole. T h a t is poration, and I speak of t h a t , because!
right. These men have a right t o do t h e trouble always is with those
'Mr. JAMES'. May I ask Mr. Thurmar
t h a t , b u t in the committee of the whole
a
question? Do you know in the laaiH
the vote w a s , very emphatic and it w a s
overwhelming t h a t if this principle of fifteen years in U t a h Territory whertfl
the right of the public by the strong a r m t h e railroads have taken a piece ofl
of the l a w w a s to be exercised t o the ex- property from any individual and not!
t e n t of t a k i n g a man's property a w a y paid for it?
Mr. THURMAN. Yes, sir.
from him, it is as little as"the public could
Mr. JAMES. Would you name aj
be expected t o do t o p a y the owner of
the property in .advance. Now, t o case?
Mr. THURMAN. I will name the inshow t h a t I do not wish enterprises t o
be obstructed or stubborn men t o have stance.
Mr. JAMES. Will you name the comthe chance t o annoy, harass, or prevent them, I do not care h o w summary p a n y and the case?
Mr. THURMAN. Yes, I will ; name^
the proceedings m a y be provided by
law as long as it is an impartial method the company; I do n o t suppose it will'$
by which the compensation m a y be be giving a w a y secrets.
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Without the
ascertained, but I say let it be ascertained and the p a r t y w h o proposes t o consent of the owner, Mr. Thurman? ; *
Mr. THURMAN. Why, of course W
t a k e the x>roperty be compelled t o p a y
for it before possession is taken. If the w a s w i t h o u t the consent of the owner."
ordinary course of the l a w is t o o tedious I will name an instance under the law;
and t o o slow and m a y retard private which exists in the Territory of U t a h !
^enterprises, I , do n o t care if you make to-day, in which a man was cited to;
a summary method by which a jury of appear in court and have the question:!
three men may be picked up from the of the^necessity of t a k i n g the property^
neighborhood of the owner—men ac- determined and also appraise the value*
-quainted*with the property, and let them of it. T h a t corporation had offered the!
appraise the value, and when they have m a n $300 for his property. They weril
^appraised the value, demand t h a t pay- willing to pay him $300 and rather:
m e n t be made in advance or hands off. t h a n go t o law he offered to take $80$
No m a t t e r who it is, no m a t t e r h o w for his property, though protesting all:
g r a n d and how mighty and h o w all t h e time t h a t it w a s w o r t h more thai*
pervading the power m a y be t h a t pro- t h a t . At last when we reached a juryf
poses t o lay its hands upon the prop- the jury gave the m a n $1500 for his;
erty of t h e individual, I say compel it property. There w a s this righteous^
t o pay for the privilege, or hands off. corporation t h a t my friend from Utah
H a s it come t o pass t h a t here in free County referred t o the other day, and^
America we a t t a c h less importance this same question, when the committee
t o this t h a n they did in old England a of the whole overwhelmingly voted to:
hundred years ago? Why, if I were an place this measure in the article as we;
eloquent man, I might repeat t o you find it here. There w a s the righteousthe words of Lord Chatham, spoken corporation exercising a power under d
Upon the floor of the house of commons constitutional l a w . In t h a t case itl
whenDigitized
he says,
"The poorest m a n in his w a s unconstitutional.
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Mr. RICHARDS. Will the gentleman
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